The Al-Qaeda Accelerant in Boko Haram’s Rise by Zenn, Jacob
U.S. Naval War College 
U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons 
CIWAG Case Studies Reports & Studies 
6-2017 
The Al-Qaeda Accelerant in Boko Haram’s Rise 
Jacob Zenn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies 
Recommended Citation 
Zenn, Jacob, "The Al-Qaeda Accelerant in Boko Haram’s Rise" (2017). CIWAG Case Studies. 3. 
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies/3 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Reports & Studies at U.S. Naval War College Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in CIWAG Case Studies by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval 
War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu. 
irregular warfare studies 
number 1
 center ON 
  irregular warfare
  AND armed groups
The Al-Qaeda Accelerant
in Boko Haram’s Rise 
Jacob Zenn
U. S. Naval War College
The Al-Qaeda Accelerant in 
Boko Haram’s Rise
In 2008,  the U.S. Naval War College established the Center on Irregular Warfare 
and Armed Groups (CIWAG). The center’s primary mission is to bring together 
operators, practitioners, and scholars to share academic expertise and knowledge 
about and operational experience in violent and nonviolent irregular warfare chal-
lenges, and to make this important research available to a wider community of 
interest. Our intent is also to include use of these materials within joint professional 
military educational ( JPME) curricula to fulfill the needs of military practitioners 
preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world. CIWAG’s two series of case 
study publications are part of the center’s expansive, ongoing program of workshops, 
symposia, lectures, research, and writing. 
The Irregular Warfare Studies are a collection of case studies that examine the use 
of irregular warfare strategies by states and nonstate actors to achieve political goals. 
These cases address a wide variety of irregular challenges on the spectrum of political 
violence and competition that encompass current-day or historic armed groups and 
conflicts, as well as the use of other irregular strategies and means to achieve political 
goals, including gray-zone activities, economic coercion, information operations, 
and resource competition.
The views expressed in the Irregular Warfare Studies series are those of the individual 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of CIWAG, the U.S. Naval War 
College, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of Defense.
Irregular Warfare Studies
Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups
U. S. Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
Newport, Rhode Island  02841
The Al-Qaeda Accelerant in 
Boko Haram’s Rise
by Jacob Zenn
U. S. Naval War College
Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-00001
ISBN: 978-1-935352-51-8
Center on Irregular Warfare 
and Armed Groups (CIWAG)
U.S. Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
Newport, Rhode Island 02841
Published 2019
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN: 978-1-935352-51-8 (paperback)
This publication is cleared for public release 
and available on the CIWAG webpage at: 
https://usnwc.edu/ciwag 
For more information contact: 
ciwag@usnwc.edu. 
Suggested citation: 
Zenn, Jacob The Al-Qaeda Accelerant in Boko 
Haram’s Rise. Newport: Center on Irregular 
Warfare and Armed Groups, U. S. Naval 
War College, 2019.
The logo of the U.S. Naval War College authen-
ticates Irregular Warfare Studies, Number 1, 
The Al-Qaeda Accelerant in Boko Haram’s Rise, 
by Jacob Zenn, ISBN: 978-1-935352-51-8, 
as the official U.S. Naval War College edition 
of this publication. Use of the U.S. Naval War 
College logo and ISBN: 978-1-935352-51-8 is 
strictly prohibited without the express written 
permission of the Editor (or Editor’s designee), 
Naval War College Press.
Reproduction and distribution are subject to the 
Copyright Act of 1976 and applicable treaties of 
the United States. Copies of all or any portion of 
this work must be clearly labeled as such, and are 
required to credit the author, series, full title, and 
the U.S. Naval War College. Contact the Naval 
War College Press regarding commercial use  
and copyrights.
 Naval War College Press
 Code 32
 686 Cushing Road
 Newport, Rhode Island 02841
 401.841.2236 telephone 
 401.841.1071 fax 
 DSN exchange: 841 
 press@usnwc.edu
 https://usnwc.edu/nwcpress
Contents
List of Illustrations  vi
Message from the Editors 3
Introduction The Chibok Kidnapping  5
 AQIM’s Response 7
 Islamic State’s Response 9
 A Note on Names and History 11
 Al-Qaeda’s Hand in Nigeria 14
CHAPTER ONE Al-Qaeda Reaches Into Nigeria  21
 Bin Laden’s Early Encounters with Nigerians 23
 Yusuf and His Following 26
 Shekau and AQIM Connect 29
CHAPTER TWO AQIM Enters Nigeria 39
 The JAS Shekau Faction 41
 The JAS AQIM Faction 43
 Ansaru 47
CHAPTER THREE From AQIM to ISIS 57
 The JAS Shekau Faction Wins Out 59
 Creating the Caliphate 64
 The Caliphate in Crisis 69
Conclusion Future Scenarios 77
Study Guide  81
About the Author  87
Illustrations
1.1 Evolution of the Nigerian Taliban to JAS 1996-2017  14
2.1 Locations of attacks by JAS and Ansaru from 2010-2012 40
2.2 JAS, JAS AQIM, and Ansaru attacks 2010-2012  41
The Al-Qaeda Accelerant in 
Boko Haram’s Rise

Message from the Editors
The group known as Boko Haram made international headlines in 2014 
with its audacious kidnapping raid on a girls’ school in Chibok, Nigeria. 
The Twitter hashtag #bringbackourgirls transformed the news into a social 
media meme, and Boko Haram (“Western education is forbidden”) briefly 
became a household name. But the group had existed long before its brush 
with social media infamy; and long after news of the Chibok girls disap-
peared from the headlines, the group continues to plague northern Nige-
ria and the Chad Lake basin countries. So who are the members of Boko 
Haram? What are their goals? How have they persisted?
Jacob Zenn’s case study, the Al-Qaeda Accelerant in Boko Haram’s Rise, 
starts by challenging the very name Boko Haram. The case maps the group’s 
many factions, loyalties, splinterings, and re-formations, while accompany-
ing diagrams help track this evolution. Readers expecting a quick gloss of 
names, dates, and places may need to take a deep breath; the splintering 
is complex, creates complicated layers of overlapping rivalries, and defies 
straightforward organizational charts. But as the story unfolds of how and 
why JAS has evolved from Boko Haram, Zenn supplies deep insight into 
the seams and gaps that exist, and explains how strategic and tactical moti-
vations have propelled an armed group to regional importance.
This close analysis has further significance. Zenn dissects how the evolu-
tion of JAS has taken place under the watchful eye, and often the directing 
hands, of both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham. The 
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case, drawn extensively from primary-source materials, shines a spotlight 
on these groups’ different strategies for recruiting and managing JAS as a 
subordinate local group and highlights JAS’s starring role in a new interna-
tional rivalry: the uncivil war between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. This 
study is up to date as of its release in the summer of 2017.
Andrea Dew
CIWAG, Co-Director
David A. Brown
CIWAG, Co-Director
Andrea Dew
CIWAG, Co- irector
David A. Brown
CIWAG, Co-Director
Andrea Dew
CIWAG, Co-Director
David A. Brown
CIWAG, Co-Director
Introduction
The Chibok Kidnapping
“We’re here to protect you, Boko Haram
is coming and you need to evacuate.”
More than 250 schoolgirls at the Government Secondary School in Chibok, 
Nigeria immediately woke up from their beds on the night of April 14, 
2014 and saw soldiers dressed in green military fatigues surrounding their 
dormitory. They knew the group commonly called Boko Haram operated 
in the area and—only weeks before—had attacked Chibok itself, causing 
their school to be shut down for safety reasons. School had reopened for 
this one day so national exams could be held. 
Leaving their dormitory with the soldiers meant the girls would miss their 
once-in-a-year opportunity to take the exam. But safety was more impor-
tant than any girl’s worst nightmare: a Boko Haram commander in the 
A still image from a May 2014 Boko Haram video of the kidnapped  
Chibok schoolgirls being held captive.
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mountains near Chibok was notorious for kidnapping girls, forcing them 
to be porters and cooks, and ordering them to behead captives.1 Not only 
would Boko Haram exploit any female captive, but would the villagers in 
Chibok welcome back a “Boko Haram girl” if she ever became free again? 
Once “married” to a Boko Haram member? Perhaps even the mother of a 
“Boko Haram child”? 
The soldiers were in a convoy of pickup trucks with official Nigerian army 
insignias. Group by group they filtered the girls into the back of each truck 
until the trucks were filled to capacity. Within an hour all of the girls were 
piled in and ready to go.
But some of the girls noticed something odd. Why were the soldiers steal-
ing the school’s gasoline, cooking supplies, and pens and paper? Once the 
convoy left for the bush, the girls were wondering where they were headed. 
The soldiers told them not to say a word, or else Boko Haram would hear 
them. So the girls whispered among themselves. They told each other they 
weren’t going toward Chibok. They were heading south, toward Sambisa 
Forest—the known base of Boko Haram’s leadership.
When the convoy came to a stop after a few hours, several dozen girls made a 
run for it. They didn’t know where they were or who they were with, but they 
didn’t trust these soldiers. Even soldiers were known to be abusive. Before the 
girls escaped into the bush, they took one last look at the convoy in the dis-
tance. Little did they know that they would never see many of their classmates 
again. For the “soldiers” were not soldiers: they were members of Boko Haram.2 
When news of the kidnapping made it to Nigeria’s federal government, the 
government first denied a kidnapping took place; but upon receiving evi-
dence, the country’s leaders admitted there was a kidnapping but claimed 
that most of the girls had been rescued.3 Then the government then said 
only 100 girls were taken. Finally, after several days, the government could 
no longer refute the parents’ evidence that more than 250 of their daugh-
ters were missing.4 Nonetheless, the rest of the world did not pay attention: 
the news cycles were still focused on the mysterious disappearance of Ma-
laysia Airlines Flight 370 the previous month, and Boko Haram had carried 
out dozens of similar, albeit smaller-scale, kidnappings of women that had 
also been ignored.5  
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But nearly one month after the kidnapping, the world finally took notice 
when Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau appeared in a split-screen 
video with 100 of the girls at a hideout in Sambisa Forest and said, “I will 
sell your girls in the market. It is Allah that instructed me to sell them. I will 
sell them until we soak the ground of Nigeria with Christian blood and so-
called Muslims contradicting Islam.” 6  
No jihadist group—or any militant group in recent memory—had ever so 
blatantly promoted slavery in this way; al-Qaeda never even took up the 
issue of slavery in its theological reasoning for conducting jihad against the 
West and the “Crusaders.” Once the media picked up on Shekau’s speech, 
the Chibok kidnapping became the world’s top news item, and a viral 
global hashtag campaign and corresponding Nigeria-based protest move-
ment, #Bringbackourgirls, was formed to demand that the Nigerian gov-
ernment rescue them. Shekau, however, became notorious in the months 
after the kidnapping for taunting the Nigerian government and the girls’ 
families. For example, he went on video on the three-month anniversary of 
the kidnapping and chanted, “Bring back our army! Bring back our army, 
hahahaha!” in reference to Boko Haram’s pilfering tanks from the Nigerian 
army—and, of course, playing on the words of the hashtag campaign.7  
Despite claiming numerous times over the next three years that Boko Ha-
ram would soon be defeated, on April 14, 2017, the three-year anniversary 
of the kidnapping, only two other girls had escaped custody. 8 Nonetheless, 
Boko Haram managed to negotiate for the release of 23 Chibok girls in 
October 2016 and 82 more Chibok girls in May 2017 in return for Boko 
Haram prisoners and reportedly undisclosed sums of money. This showed 
that there was still some hope of recovering most, if not all, of the kidnapped 
girls. On the other hand, that Boko Haram help captive so many girls for so 
long with all of the freed girls apparently well fed and medically fit showed 
that the Boko Haram’s control of territory and supply lines were more 
intact that the government had portrayed.
AQIM’s Response
Watching Shekau’s bravado in claiming the Chibok kidnapping, al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) — which was originally called the Salafist 
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Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)—could only look on with res-
ervation. Ever since becoming a formal al-Qaeda affiliate in 2007, AQIM 
had concentrated its efforts on expanding southwards into sub-Saharan 
West Africa—and Nigeria was a goldmine.9 AQIM was founded by Arab 
Algerians as one of the anti-government insurgent groups in the Alge-
rian civil war in 1990s, but by the mid-2000s Algerian security forces had 
eliminated many of the insurgents or reconciled with them in an amnesty 
program. The most violent insurgent faction, the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA), lost popular support after it declared takfir (an Arabic-Islamic term 
for “apostasy,” which, according to jihadists, warrants the death penalty) on 
the entire Algerian population that did not join the GIA. Thus, by 2007, 
AQIM was the one insurgent faction that had outlasted all others. 
AQIM’s shift south to the trans-Sahel countries of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
and later Nigeria was induced by the Algerian military strategy of accepting 
a status quo with AQIM: AQIM would operate mostly outside of Alge-
ria, and the military would generally not frustrate its activities as long as 
they were not in Algeria. AQIM, meanwhile, thrived in the Sahel, where 
it kidnapped foreign tourists and engineers for large ransoms from tourist 
and mining sites dotting the region.10 AQIM members also learned to use 
GPS systems to store arms, set up training camps in desert hideouts, and 
embedded themselves in the Sahel by marrying into and recruiting among 
the West African tribes and clans and developing narratives tailored to 
the West African context. (Focusing on the reconquest of Spain, or Anda-
lusia, for example, had much less resonance to West Africans than it did 
to Algerians, while focusing on a historical figure like Usman dan Fodio11 
appealed more to West Africans, especially Nigerians.) AQIM’s expansion 
in the Sahel reached an apex in April 2012 when it took over northern Mali 
alongside its mostly Tuareg ally, Ansar Dine, 12 and Movement for Unity 
[Monotheism] and jihad in West Africa (MUJWA)13, comprised of fighters 
from various West African ethnic groups in Mali and neighboring coun-
tries. A French-led intervention code-named Operational Serval, however, 
finally ousted those groups from northern Mali in early 2013. AQIM 
nonetheless continued to carry out major attacks over the ensuing years in 
northern Mali and, occasionally, neighboring countries and by 2017 it had 
formalized a new and increasingly active insurgent coalition of groups in 
northern Mali.
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Despite AQIM’s push south, it could no longer justify its relationship with 
Boko Haram in Nigeria after 2014, with Shekau reviving “slavery” and 
carrying out attacks resulting in mass Muslim civilian casualties. Ever since 
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) went on a spree of killing Shias in grisly fashion in 
Iraq in the mid-2000s, al-Qaeda was trying show Muslim masses around 
the world that it was more “humane” than depicted by the “Crusader” media. 
Although slavery of Christians (almost all of the girls in Chibok were 
Christian) may have had some theological resonance for hard-line Salafi 
jihadis, and some al-Qaeda members thought the kidnapping was justifi-
able if the girls were exchanged for Boko Haram prisoners, this tactic—and 
Shekau’s audacious boasting of it—was not the way for al-Qaeda to win 
“hearts and minds.” 
Islamic State’s Response
At the time of the Chibok kidnapping, Islamic State was just three months 
away from Abubakar al-Baghdadi’s July 2014 declaration of a caliphate. 
Islamic State was in need of “provinces” around the world that would show 
its global reach. Moreover, unlike al-Qaeda, Islamic State thrived on gain-
ing attention through unprecedented acts of terror and brutality that it 
posted on social media for the world to see: immolation of captives, bury-
ing victims alive, and drowning enemies in acid. These and other actions 
carried al-Zarqawi’s legacy that al-Qaeda had rejected for image reasons 
(not necessarily out of principle). The “Revival of Slavery”—as Islamic 
State would title an edition in its premiere magazine, Dabiq—praised the 
Chibok kidnapping, and other Islamic State statements showed that Boko 
Haram set a precedent for it to take up the tactic of kidnapping Yazidi 
women in Iraq and Syria later that year.14 After the Chibok kidnapping, 
Islamic State knew it wanted Boko Haram to become its “West Africa 
Province” and Shekau to be the wali, or governor.
How did Boko Haram become part of the chess match between al-Qaeda 
and Islamic State at the international level? And at the local level, how did 
Boko Haram develop the capability to kidnap more than 250 girls in one 
night, have a propaganda campaign that captivated the world’s attention, 
and keep all but two of the girls from escaping for more than three years, 
while still maintaining the patience, leadership hierarchy and organization 
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to concluded negotiations for the release of 23 and 83 girls in October 
2016 and May 2017? Only one decade before the Chibok kidnapping, in 
2004, Boko Haram was an upstart but struggling group. Yet, by 2014 it 
had risen to the highest levels of international notoriety, and in 2015 it was 
ranked the world’s most deadly terrorist group.15 
This case study answers these questions—but, first, it is important to under-
stand that Boko Haram is not what you think it is. In fact, there is no group 
called Boko Haram. Boko Haram has never existed. 
Does this mean all of the violence in Nigeria has been a figment of the world’s 
imagination and that the Chibok kidnapping is merely a conspiracy?16 Of 
course not. 
Boko Haram did not carry out the Chibok kidnapping because the group’s 
name is not really Boko Haram. Indeed, using the name “Boko Haram” can 
be highly misleading in terms of understanding its origins, evolutions, and 
capabilities. Why?
In fact, four groups make up what is commonly known as Boko Haram: the 
Nigerian Taliban, JAS, Ansaru, and the West Africa Province:
Nigerian Taliban existed from the 1990s until 2009 and was the prede-
cessor of JAS before Shekau announced its formation in 2010.
JAS 1.0 and 2.0 (full name: Jama’atu Ahlisunnah Lida’awati Wal-Jihad) 
existed from 2010 to March 2015 in its first iteration, which until 2014 in-
cluded a Shekau faction and an AQIM faction. This can be called JAS 1.0. 
In August 2016, it formed again under the same name. This can be called 
JAS 2.0. Both iterations have been under Shekau’s leadership.
Ansaru (full name: Jama’atul Ansaru Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan) was 
known as al-Qaeda in the Lands Beyond the Sahel in 2011 but changed 
its name to Ansaru in 2012 and has existed from 2012 to the present, 
although it has been operationally dormant since 2013. Its leader, Khalid 
al-Barnawi, was arrested in April 2016, leaving the group leaderless. Ansaru 
is affiliated with al-Qaeda.
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West Africa Province has existed from March 2015 to the present. It  
was under Shekau’s leadership with a Shekau faction and an Abu Musab  
al-Barnawi faction (no familial relation to Khalid al-Barnawi) from 
March 2015 to August 2016; since August 2016, it has been under Abu 
Musab al-Barnawi’s leadership. West Africa Province is affiliated with 
Islamic State (IS).
So who carried out the Chibok kidnapping?
The answer is, of course, JAS 1.0. West Africa Province did not exist in 
April 2014, and Ansaru was operationally dormant by then. If Ansaru 
had been responsible, it would likely have claimed the kidnapping and 
the kidnapping would have been attributed to “Ansaru” by the media, not 
“Boko Haram”. But the “bonus answer” is JAS 1.5, including elements of its 
former AQIM faction and former Ansaru members who reintegrated with 
JAS at the time of the kidnapping. 
Complicated? Yes. But this complexity and factionalization has become 
all too common in the dynamic contest between al-Qaeda and IS for the 
affiliation of salafist groups around the world. Moreover, mastering these 
complex dynamics is the first step to understanding the ever evolving front 
lines in their competition and to understanding the role local groups with 
outsized ambitions play in expanding salafist movements.  
A Note on Names and History
Nigerian Taliban, JAS 1.0 and 2.0, Ansaru, and West Africa Province 
From the early 1990s, when Osama bin Laden first “invested” in a jihadi 
movement in Nigeria, until 2009, the group now commonly referred to 
as Boko Haram was most often called the “Nigerian Taliban” (or “Yobe 
Taliban,” in reference to the Nigerian state where it was most active).17 The 
Nigerian Taliban’s first leader, Muhammed Ali, and his followers sought to 
emulate the governance and society of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Nige-
rians who encountered the Nigerian Taliban after Muhammed Ali’s death 
in 2004, however, increasingly became familiar with one aspect of the core 
ideology of his successor, Muhammed Yusuf. Yusuf was best known for 
his belief that boko 18 (Western education or, literally, books) was haram 
12  irregular warfare studies 
(blasphemous).19 Hence people in northern Nigeria called the group “Boko 
Haram,” a name which the media, politicians, and later the world at large 
adopted that translates to “Western education is blasphemous.”
Nigerian security forces nearly wiped out the Nigerian Taliban in 2009, but it 
resurfaced in 2010 under Abubakar Shekau’s leadership. Shekau renamed the 
group Jama’atu Ahlisunnah Lida’awati Wal-Jihad (for lack of a better acronym, 
“JAS” is used in this case study). This name, which in Arabic literally means 
the “[Sunni Muslim] Group for Preaching and Jihad,” implied that the days 
of preaching were over and the movement would move to the phase of jihad. 
Muhammed Yusuf ’s son, Abu Musab al-Barnawi,20 who would later become 
a leader in West Africa Province, acknowledged the name was too long 
and an acronym for it so unsuitable that people still called the group Boko 
Haram, even though JAS considered the name to be a slander. 21 And on no 
few occasions Shekau threatened that anyone who called the group Boko 
Haram would be killed. According to Shekau, JAS was about much more 
than boko being haram; it was also about “Western education [being] part 
of a broader civilizational project to detach Muslims from Islam and its 
Arabic language traditions, and instead immerse Muslims in Christianity 
and English language.”22 
To add to this complexity, in 2011, a group emerged called al-Qaeda in the 
Lands Beyond the Sahel (AQLBS), which changed its name to Jama’atu 
Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (“Vanguards for the Protection of 
Muslims in Black Africa”), or Ansaru, in 2012, in part to disguise its affili-
ation to al-Qaeda.23 This was comprised of Nigerian AQIM members who 
were so dissatisfied with Shekau’s killings of Muslims that they formed their 
own group. This group is called Ansaru in this case study. 
Not to be outdone, another faction emerged within JAS—as opposed to 
outside of JAS’s organizational structure like Ansaru—that was comprised 
of AQIM-trained Nigerian militants who disagreed with Shekau’s killing of 
Muslims but who remained part of JAS and tolerated Shekau’s authority as 
leader. This faction is called the JAS AQIM faction in this case study. The 
faction within JAS that was both loyal to and supportive of Shekau is called 
the JAS Shekau faction in this case study.
the al-qaeda accelerant in boko haram’s rise  13
Beginning in 2013, Ansaru and the JAS AQIM faction began to weaken 
for reasons discussed below, and many of their members rejoined the JAS 
Shekau faction, unifying again briefly under the umbrella of JAS ( JAS 1.5). 
However, by 2015, JAS 1.5 pledged its allegiance to the newly powerful IS 
and became Islamic State’s West Africa Province. The state of play at this 
point became typically splintered and complicated: the group formerly 
known as JAS ceased to exist; Ansaru existed, albeit in operational dor-
mancy; and West Africa Province carried the legacy of JAS, the JAS AQIM 
faction, and many Ansaru members who left Ansaru to join JAS 1.5 and 
then West Africa Province. 
Within months, however, West Africa Province became factionalized 
into the Abu Musab al-Barnawi faction, referring to Muhammed Yusuf ’s 
son who led that faction, and the Shekau faction, referring to the Shekau 
loyalists in West Africa Province. And by 2016, the Abu Musab al-Barnawi 
faction had deposed Shekau in an internal coup supported by ISIS. The 
underlying rivalry was exposed when the Shekau faction continued to 
kill Muslim civilians and in defiance of orders from ISIS to Muslim who 
Shekau considered to be apostates as “slaves.” ISIS acknowledged the coup 
and recognized Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the West Africa Province wali, 
and the ousted Shekau faction regrouped and resurrected JAS 2.0. 
As of this writing in 2017, therefore, the main groups are West Africa Prov-
ince, which is led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi; JAS 2.0, which is led by Shekau; 
and Ansaru, which is recognized by al-Qaeda, although it is operationally 
dormant and has no known active leader. Nonetheless, “Boko Haram” 
continues to be used to refer to West Africa Province and JAS, although not 
Ansaru: thus, if either West Africa Province or JAS were to carry out a major 
attack, it would currently be reported as a Boko Haram attack, while when 
Ansaru carried out attacks they were attributed to Ansaru.
Now that this name game has shed light on the history of the various 
groups and factions known as Boko Haram, it is important to review 
the hand that al-Qaeda was dealt in Nigeria, as this allowed al-Qaeda to 
accelerate the rise of the Nigerian Taliban and its successor groups. The 
following section will explore the origins of the Nigerian Taliban.
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Figure 1.1. Evolution of the Nigerian Taliban to JAS 1996-2017
Al-Qaeda’s Hand in Nigeria
In the mid-1990s, Osama bin Laden was living in Sudan. He had left the 
jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s for his native Saudi Arabia, but was 
exiled from Saudi Arabia to Sudan because of his criticism of Saudi Arabia’s 
hosting U.S. troops on its soil to oust Saddam Hussain’s Iraqi army from 
Kuwait in the first Persian Gulf War instead of using Afghanistan muja-
hideen veterans. Bin Laden’s plan to fight the U.S., which he considered 
Islam’s number one enemy after the fall of the Soviet Union, involved a 
classic terrorist tactic: provoke the U.S. into engaging in a costly, unending, 
overseas military campaign against an enemy (al-Qaeda) that could not be 
eliminated and that was highly motivated (inspired by faith in Allah). He 
thus trained a group of fighters in Sudan who were loosely connected to the 
Battle of Mogadishu in 1992. Under diplomatic pressure from the U.S., bin 
Laden was again exiled from Sudan in 1996 and returned to Afghanistan, 
while the networks he left behind continued on without him. His fighters 
were directly involved in the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, 
Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 1998, which killed 200 people, 
as well as the bombing of the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen in 2000.24 
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Except for the retaliatory bombing of the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory 
in Sudan in 1998, which was believed to be a weapons manufacturing hub, 
the U.S. did not respond in the way he wanted. 
Bin Laden’s networks of fighters included Nigerians he met in Sudan. Al-
though Nigeria was on the other side of the continent from Sudan and far 
from Afghanistan, it featured in Bin Laden’s overall strategy for several reasons: 
Overextending the enemy. According to Abubakr Naji’s Management of 
Savagery,25 adding Nigeria as jihadist front would allow al-Qaeda to perform 
“retaliatory action” against the “enemy” in Nigeria if it “perpetrated a hostile 
act against a region in the Arabian Peninsula or Iraq.” Not only would this 
“confuse the enemy … if the region where the retaliatory action occurs is gov-
erned by an infidel regime,” such as Nigeria, but it would also send a “practical 
message to Muslims everywhere that we are one nation and that our duty is 
not hindered by political borders.” 
Economic warfare. Naji also argued that kidnapping an engineer in Nige-
ria’s oil sector (or a journalist or Christian) could serve the purpose of making 
a demand on the Nigerian government to stop selling oil to the U.S as part 
of economic warfare.26 Destabilizing Nigeria, more generally, would hurt the 
Western economies that benefit from Nigeria’s oil production, which was 
part of an evolving al-Qaeda “economic warfare” strategy that bin Laden had 
developed to target the global energy industry. In 2003 bin Laden for the first 
time listed Nigeria as a country that was “ready for liberation,” along with 
Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco.27
Global narratives. Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, with about 
80 million Muslims (predominantly in the north) and 80 million Christians 
(predominantly in the south). The two religious groups have a history of 
clashing over land use, including in recent decades between Muslim Fulani 
herders who have been forced southwards to seek fertile pastures and the 
predominantly Christian tribes who are indigenous to the area known as the 
Middle Belt.28 These clashes often rise to the level of being perceived as battles 
between Islam and Christianity and may explain why polls have consistently 
shown that Nigerian Muslims have among the most favorable views of al-
Qaeda, the Taliban, Islamic State, and suicide bombings of any demographic 
in the world (although such support significantly decreased in proportion to 
the increase in JAS-related violence in the country since 2012).29 Avenging 
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Muslim deaths in Nigeria would thus fit well in the narrative bin Laden was 
trying to create of Muslims fighting the “Crusaders.”
But there were also domestic conditions—beyond the fault line in the Middle 
Belt—that provided the Nigerian Taliban with a fertile environment to grow. 
According one perspective, the Nigerian Taliban emerged in a fertile ter-
rain for an ideology like al-Qaeda’s to take root. After 1979, Persian Gulf 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar poured hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars into Nigeria to offset Shia (and Sufi) influence in the coun-
try through the promotion of Salafism. Iran’s Islamic Revolution stirred up 
hopes among some northern Nigerian Muslims that they, too, could create 
an Islamic government in Nigeria, while some Nigerian Sunni Muslim 
groups shifted towards Shiism. Although the Gulf countries successfully 
inculcated Salafism in northern Nigeria and the Salafi Izala30 movement 
became Nigeria’s largest Muslim movement by the 1990s, various break-off 
groups of Izala started leaning towards doctrines of takfirism,31 opposition 
to Western education, and jihadism. These breakoff groups evolved into 
what would become the Nigerian Taliban, which would link financially 
and operationally with al-Qaeda even as leaders of the “mainstream” Izala 
movement shied away from such a relationship.
According to another perspective, the emergence of the Nigerian Taliban 
has a local, not transnational, focus. In this view, the Nigerian Taliban spe-
cifically rose in Borno State and Yobe State because those two states were 
suffering from desertification and a shrinking Lake Chad. The northern 
Nigerian background of poverty and illiteracy also added to the depriva-
tion that allowed the Nigerian Taliban to gain a foothold. 
In yet another perspective, historical, socioeconomic, and political factors 
are responsible for the emergence of the Nigerian Taliban and successor 
organizations.
While northern Nigeria is predominantly Muslim (despite the migration 
of southern Nigerian Christians to the region throughout several genera-
tions), Borno and Yobe are distinct from the rest of northern Nigeria. 
These two states are the homelands of Nigeria’s Kanuri population, who 
although almost all Muslims, are distinct linguistically, culturally, and histor-
ically from the Muslim Hausa-Fulanis32 of the rest of northern Nigeria. The 
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Kanuris have arguably gotten a raw deal in post-colonial Nigeria compared 
to the Hausa-Fulanis. 
The Kanuris led successions of one of Africa’s most powerful caliphates 
around Lake Chad for nearly 1,000 years until its dissolution in the late 
1800s at the hands of English, French, and German colonial armies and 
local allies as well as the Kanuris’ other rivals, such as the Hausa-Fulanis, 
whose leaders waged jihad against the caliphate in the early 1800s.33 The 
former Kanem-Borno territories have since been divided among Borno and 
Yobe in Nigeria, southeastern Niger, parts of Chad, and northern Camer-
oon—a state of affairs which Muhammed Yusuf lamented in his sermons—
while the Hausa-Fulanis in northern Nigeria and Christians in southern 
Nigeria are the dominant linguistic, religious, and political groups in their 
respective regions.34 
One of the supporting pieces of evidence for the origins of the Nigerian 
Taliban being tied to Kanuri marginalization is that JAS’s area of opera-
tions (AO) since 2010 has almost perfectly matched the boundaries of the 
Kanuri homelands of northeastern Nigeria and neighboring countries. 
Ansaru and the JAS AQIM network, in contrast, operated throughout 
northern Nigeria and, perhaps not coincidentally, focused their narratives 
on historical and regional themes relevant especially to Hausa-Fulanis. The 
leadership cadre of JAS is almost exclusively Kanuri, with Kanuri language 
most commonly used among fighters.
The case study so far has provided context on the kidnapping in Chibok 
that placed JAS in the international spotlight and set it on a trajectory to 
join Islamic State and leave al-Qaeda’s orbit; the importance of distinguish-
ing between various names and internal factions that have comprised the 
groups commonly known as Boko Haram and Ansaru; and the al-Qaeda 
strategy for targeting Nigeria as well as perspectives on why Nigeria offered 
a fertile ground for al-Qaeda infiltration. 
If these were the cards al-Qaeda had to play with in Nigeria, did it make the 
right wager? If so, which were the correct strategic moves al-Qaeda made? 
If not, which errors did al-Qaeda make, and were such errors foreseeable? 
These are questions to track throughout this case study.
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Al-Qaeda Reaches Into Nigeria
In March 2017, 46-year-old Ibrahim Harun, a national of Niger but born 
in Saudi Arabia, was convicted in the Eastern District of New York for 
conspiracy to murder U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan and bomb 
the U.S. embassy in Nigeria. Harun had traveled from Saudi Arabia to 
Afghanistan several weeks before the September 11, 2001 attacks to train 
with al-Qaeda. After September 11, Harun received weapons and explo-
sives trainings in Afghanistan in preparation for the U.S. invasion. He later 
crossed the border to Pakistan, where he trained under Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, 
one of bin Laden’s deputies who was al-Qaeda’s top military commander 
in Afghanistan. Harun’s training enabled him carry out an ambush on the 
Afghan side of the border that killed two U.S. servicemen in 2003. 
Harun, who was wounded in the operation, returned to Pakistan to re-
cover, where he met Abu Faraj al-Libi, then al Qaeda’s external operations 
chief, and pledged baya’a (loyalty) to bin Laden. Harun also expressed 
interest in carrying out attacks on American interests in his native Africa 
similar to the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 
The al-Qaeda representative to the GSPC35 and Africa, Yemeni national 
Imad Abdel Wahid Ahmad Alwan, was killed in Algeria in 2002 after hav-
ing visited Nigeria, Niger, and Chad. This left that position open for Harun 
to become his successor. 
Harun thus traveled to Nigeria in 2003 on behalf of al-Qaeda’s external 
operations unit with orders to target “the head of the snake” at “locations 
where Americans congregate,” such as embassies, hotels and “places where 
they gather for fun.” The U.S. embassy in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, was the 
main target, with the goal of an attack before the U.S. elections in 2004 to 
maximize its impact.36 Harun connected with the Nigerian Taliban, whose 
leader, Muhammed Ali, had been a bin Laden disciple in Sudan in the 
1990s, and recruited members of the Nigerian Taliban to scout the U.S. 
embassy. Once the attack plan was set, Harun deployed Ali’s deputy and 
another Nigerian Taliban member to al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan to de-
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liver the attack plans in encoded compact disks. Both couriers were arrested 
at the airport on arrival in Pakistan and deported back to Nigeria.
Fearing he was under suspicion, Harum immediately fled Nigeria to Libya, 
where he was arrested in 2005. Although he was released from prison 
during the Libyan uprising in 2011, he was re-arrested shortly afterwards 
in Italy on a boat with migrants. His latest plan, which was thwarted, had 
been to launch new attacks in Europe.
Al-Qaeda, in the end, received little reward, at least in the short term, on 
its investment in Harun’s Nigerian mission. One of the main issues that al-
Qaeda faced was that Harun was operating far from its base in Pakistan and 
neither al-Qaeda nor the Nigerian Taliban had a strong enough regional or 
local support network on the ground in West Africa or Nigeria for him to 
be able to carry out the desired attack in Abuja. Instead he had to send two 
Nigerian Taliban couriers all the way to Pakistan to deliver his attack plan 
and coordinate the training at the Nigerian Taliban’s “Afghanistan” com-
pound, which was under watch from—and ultimate broken up by— the 
Nigerian security forces.37 
If al-Qaeda could establish a stronger regional hub in West Africa to which 
operatives like Harun could report by overland travel and a stronger network 
of trained attackers on the ground in Nigeria, Harun’s successors could have a 
greater chance of launching attacks. The solution could be to make the GSPC 
(or its successor, AQIM) the regional hub for operations in West Africa, and 
to co-opt the Nigerian Taliban to become a more formal part of al-Qaeda, 
including trainings in the Sahel that come along with that relationship. 
Given the cards al-Qaeda was dealt for Nigeria—a pre-existing Salafi 
jihadi network and a northern Nigeria region ripe with admiration for the 
Afghan Taliban, sympathy for al-Qaeda, and anti-Western historical griev-
ances—could al-Qaeda make the right moves in Nigeria after the failure of 
Harun’s mission? 
The following section discusses how al-Qaeda played its cards in Nigeria—
from developing a relationship with the Nigerian Taliban under Mu-
hammed Ali’s leadership, to working behind the scenes with Muhammed 
Ali’s successor, Muhammed Yusuf, after Ali’s death to prepare the Nigerian 
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Taliban for a jihad, to cementing an operational relationship with Yusuf ’s 
successor, Abubakar Shekau, after Yusuf ’s death. This all set the basis for 
the network that would succeed in carrying out an operation years later on 
the UN building in Abuja, just as Harun had intended, and much more. 
This collaboration, however, gave the way to new problems. With its Nige-
rian affiliate (albeit an informal one) two degrees of separation from  
al-Qaeda leadership via AQIM, al-Qaeda would encounter unexpected 
risks. This phase of interaction, adaptation, and strategic reassessment 
between al-Qaeda and the Nigerian Taliban—and what would become 
JAS—has escaped the attention of many analysts because much of the 
groundwork for the relationship occurred between 2004 and 2009 during 
a period of low violence, when the Nigerian Taliban’s militancy was flying 
under the radar of most observers. But this an important foundation in 
understanding how the Nigerian Taliban developed to become the threat 
that JAS and West Africa Province are today.
Bin Laden’s Early Encounters with Nigerians
The first—and most important—connection Bin Laden made in Nigeria 
was through the man who would become the founder of the Nigerian Tali-
ban and its successors: Muhammed Ali. From Borno State, Muhammed Ali 
attended an Islamic university in Khartoum, Sudan in the mid-1990s when 
Bin Laden was living in Sudan and building the proto al-Qaeda organiza-
tion that would carry out the U.S. embassy bombings in 1998. Ali and 
another young Nigerian, Khalid al-Barnawi, who was in Sudan fighting in 
the jihads against South Sudan, met with Bin Laden, and they became his 
followers and pledged their baya’a to him. Bin Laden, in turn, promised Ali 
seed funding of up to $3 million to establish a jihadist movement in Nigeria. 
While in Sudan, Ali began looking at the various Salafi networks in Nigeria 
to find a group to become a new jihadist movement. There were numerous 
Islamic scholars who, like the leading preacher of Izala, Sheikh Jafaar Adam 
Mahmoud, showed sympathy for al-Qaeda and its leaders such as bin Laden, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi for their using “Western 
knowledge to counter the Americans.” 39 However, Sheikh Jafaar believed 
the best way to establish an Islamic government was to acquire Western 
education and then work from within the government—not necessarily 
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through violent jihad—to eliminate the perceived legacies of British colo-
nialism (secularism and democracy, for example) and replace them with 
an Islamic system.40 Any “mainstream” scholar from Izala would thus be an 
unlikely fit for Ali’s new movement.
However, some of the Izala breakoff groups presented opportunities. For 
example, a young preacher and mentee of Sheikh Jafaar, Muhammed Yusuf, 
commonly referenced Saudi Salafi jihadi theologians in his sermons and 
considered the “pure Salafists” to be 13th-century Islamic scholar and “father 
of wahabbism” Ibn Taymiya, Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Hassan al-
Bana, the Taliban, and bin Laden.41 Yusuf was more predisposed to violent 
jihad than members of Izala, but some of his beliefs were ridiculed and 
considered extreme in Nigeria, such as his opposition to Western education 
(although he did make some concessions after debating Sheikh Jafaar).42  
Ultimately, Ali asked a Nigerian intermediary who was in Khartoum to 
coordinate with a preacher from Katsina State. But after Ali made contact 
with the preacher, the preacher came under government suspicion and fled 
to Saudi Arabia with some of bin Laden’s seed money.43 Trust and direct 
contacts with allies were issues Ali may not have considered until this point.
When Ali returned to Nigeria after September 11, 2001, he connected with 
Muhammed Yusuf and made him one of his deputies in the then-emerging 
Nigerian Taliban. Together, they recruited members later described as 
“undergraduates of universities, polytechnics and other tertiary institutions 
across the country, who regard Western education as Kafirci” (infidelity);44  
“children of wealthy and influential Nigerians [whose] parents are based in 
Maiduguri”  ; “men who [speak] impeccable English” ; “ex-military personnel 
and other professionals who quit their jobs, retreated to the [‘Afghanistan’ 
community], soaked up the Quran, and swore to oust the corrupt Nigerian 
system that they saw as antithetical to true Sharia” ; and “mainly middle-class 
Nigerian graduates inspired by the Taliban’s vision of a Islamic state, run in 
accordance with the principles of Saudi Arabia’s wahhabi sect of Islam.” 
The Nigerian Taliban was thus fairly sophisticated, and even somewhat elit-
ist. It was likely influenced not only by the Taliban’s defiance of the Ameri-
cans after 2001 but also by the widespread media exposure the Taliban 
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received precisely because of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. Numerous 
mainstream conspiracies in northern Nigeria generated resentment against 
the West and fed the Nigerian Taliban’s narrative, such as that the U.S. (and 
Nigerian Christians) sought to use the polio vaccine to reduce Muslim 
fertility in northern Nigeria. Other Nigerian Taliban members joined the 
group because they were demoralized by what they perceived as a corrupt 
system in Nigeria: the Western university education they received was use-
less when the best jobs were given to political cronies. They came to believe 
that Western education was a scam. 
As a result of the relative high status in society of some Nigerian Taliban 
members, they received support from family members and leaders or sym-
pathizers within northern Nigeria’s political and religious establishment. 
Some of these sponsors were disenchanted with the lack of full implemen-
tation of sharia, what they called “half-sharia,” in northern Nigeria after its 
implementation in 2000. The Nigerian Taliban also benefitted from the 
support of bin Laden’s seed money and other Nigerian Salafi sponsors with 
networks in Africa, the Middle East and Europe.
By 2004—not long after Harun arrived in Nigeria—Ali had set up a com-
munity of Nigerian Taliban members and their families, called “Afghani-
stan,” near the border with Niger in Yobe State, where the Nigerian Taliban 
lived according to the model of the Taliban. Details remain unclear, but 
Ali appears to have led the Nigerian Taliban in an attack on the Nigerian 
security forces around “Afghanistan” in late 2003 or early 2004 because the 
security forces were beginning to make plans to destroy the community, 
which they believed doubled as a militant training camp. The Nigerian 
Taliban were defeated in these clashes; Ali was killed; and his top deputy, 
who was one of Harun’s couriers and had been deported from Pakistan, fled 
to Saudi Arabia. Other members were arrested; Harun’s second courier, 
who had also been deported from Pakistan but freed in Nigeria and who 
provided Harun housing in Kano, was arrested in his home with maps of 
various diplomatic facilities. 
After the failure of the Nigerian Taliban’s first uprising, the group’s new 
leader, Muhammed Yusuf, was forced to reassess the group’s strategy. What 
lessons would he learn from the 2004 failure?
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Yusuf and His Following
After Muhammed Ali was killed in 2004, Muhammed Yusuf fled to Saudi 
Arabia. However, he returned to Nigeria to take over the leadership of the 
Nigerian Taliban when the Borno State government and Salafist leaders 
negotiated his peaceful return. Yusuf now led a movement that was venge-
ful but weakened, but he also learned lessons from the failed uprising. He 
realized that the Nigerian Taliban must engage in Iqamat al Hujja—an 
Arabic-Islamic term for “establishing evidence” (in this case that the Nige-
rian government is taghut, or oppressive)— before declaring jihad. 
His son, who would later become West Africa Province’s leader, said that what 
his father did was to:  
establish the nucleus of a jihadi group and called people to it. He did not start 
the jihadi work immediately, although he announced that the ultimate goal of 
the group is jihad.51  
Yusuf believed that through a gradual approach the Nigerian Taliban would 
come out victorious in its next clashes with the Nigerian security forces be-
cause it would have more followers. Over the next five years, Yusuf followed 
this plan. Using “Western” items such as radio, television, CD, and cas-
sette distribution to proselytize (a contradiction that Shekau, who became 
Yusuf ’s deputy, reconciled in a sermon52), he amassed an estimated 5,000 
dedicated adherents among the tens of thousands who sympathized with 
him. Moreover, with funding from the same channels as Muhammed Ali 
accessed prior to 2004, as well as donations from followers, the Nigerian 
Taliban was able to open a headquarters in Maiduguri and in other centers 
in northeastern Nigeria. 
At the same time as he was proselytizing, Yusuf was able to exploit the rela-
tionship with the GSPC. One of the couriers who Harun sent to Pakistan 
had established with the GSPC a relationship in which Nigerian Taliban 
members could train at GSPC camps in the Sahel. A Nigerian Taliban 
member who trained at these camps was Adam Kambar, the son of a 
wealthy Maiduguri, Borno State-based contractor; in 2006, he was arrested 
upon returning to Nigeria from training in the Sahel (he was also charged 
with killing a man in Kano, the capital of Kano State in northwest Nige-
ria).53 One of the funders of Kambar’s group of 17 militants at that training 
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was Ilyas Damagun, a friend of Yusuf, who received money from Salafist 
organizations in Sudan to deploy Nigerian Taliban members for training 
in Mauritania. (Yusuf was arrested, but released after a period of time upon 
his return to Nigeria after the 2004 clashes because of his relations with 
Damagun.) In 2006, Damagun, two of his associates—one of whom stud-
ied Islam in Mauritania, and another who studied Islam in Saudi Arabia—
and Kambar and Kambar’s co-militants were all tried on terrorism charges 
in Nigeria but released, despite the prosecutor’s personal belief that the 
evidence against Kambar was “undeniable.” 
Among the reasons for their release was that Nigerian Salafist leaders and 
northern Nigerian media outlets (Damagun owned the printing company 
for one such outlet) accused the Nigerian government of “perpetuating 
myths of an al-Qaeda presence” in Nigeria, engaging in “systematic and 
collective slander of Nigerian Muslims,” and “employing the machinery of 
the state to victimize ... Muslim organizations and individuals ... to intimi-
date and harass Islamic clerics to check the spread of Islamic conscious-
ness among the people under the guise of fundamentalism, extremism or 
terrorism.”54 Although Kambar’s release was contingent on him engaging in 
a “de-radicalization program” in the custody of leading northern Nigerian 
imams, he later reverted back to terrorism, re-joined AQIM, and by 2012 
became one of the three U.S.-designated Nigerian terrorists, along with 
Khalid al-Barnawi, who would go on to found Ansaru, and Shekau, who 
would later lead JAS.55
As Yusuf gained in popularity and more clandestinely allowed Nigerian 
Taliban fighters to train with the GSPC, he became increasingly ostracized 
from Izala. He theologically deviated from Sheikh Jafaar on issues such as 
the permissibility of Western education and accused Jafaar of “selling out” 
by working within government while seeking to Islamicize its institutions. 
On top of this, it appears that by 2007 Jafaar recognized—and sought to 
pull back from—Yusuf ’s increasingly jihadist orientation. In April 2007, 
Yusuf ’s followers assassinated Jafaar in Kano in an operation that today 
remains mired in mystery. Its most plausible explanation is the concern of 
Yusuf ’s Salafi funders that Jafaar would expose and undermine them and 
collaborate with the Nigerian security forces to eliminate the Nigerian 
Taliban and the jihadist project in Nigeria.56  
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This assassination drove a wedge not only between Yusuf and the Nigerian 
government but also between Yusuf and the prevailing Islamic religious 
authorities, and forced him to limit his preaching mostly to his native region 
of Borno and Yobe. Yusuf ’s third-in-command, Mamman Nur, a Kanuri like 
Yusuf and Shekau, preached about reviving the historical narratives of the 
fallen Islamic empires of Kanem-Borno (in present-day northeastern Nigeria) 
as well as Usman dan Fodio’s Sokoto caliphate (in present-day northwestern 
Nigeria).57 Shekau, Yusuf ’s deputy, continued to call for opposing Western 
civilization its all its manifestations: education, social values, and symbols 
(i.e., the Gregorian calendar and New Year’s holiday). This trio—Yusuf, 
Nur, and Shekau—formed the new generation of leadership of the Nigerian 
Taliban, which was gaining a following throughout the Lake Chad region but 
also becoming notorious for preaching that boko was haram.
As Yusuf had anticipated, the 2004 clashes recurred in similar fashion in 
July 2009. In this dispute, security forces shot Yusuf ’s followers who re-
fused police orders to wear motorcycle helmets because they believed such 
head coverings were an “affront to Allah.” Shortly after visiting a hospital 
where his followers were receiving treatment, Yusuf warned in a sermon 
that Nigeria would turn into a “land of jihad” like Palestine, Chechnya, 
Somalia, Kashmir, Algeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.58 Nigerian president 
Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, a Muslim born in Katsina State, ordered Nigerian 
security forces to “crush” the Nigerian Taliban.
In ensuing confrontations, the security forces killed nearly 1,000 of Yusuf ’s 
followers, arrested hundreds of others, and uncovered arms stockpiles in 
Yusuf ’s centers. Several dozen security officers were also killed.59 The secu-
rity forces destroyed Yusuf ’s main headquarters in Borno State’s capital of 
Maiduguri and interrogated Yusuf before dragging him outside and execut-
ing him. The videos of Yusuf ’s interrogation and killings of his followers 
and the photograph of Yusuf ’s mutilated corpse were spread widely on the 
Internet.60 Nigerians on jihadist forums began calling for “sustaining the 
dignity of the Sokoto jihad” and unifying with the “brothers of Chechnya, 
the unrelenting gladiators of Afghanistan, the fierce brothers of Iraq, the 
troops of Muwahhidin [monotheists] in Somalia and the Brigades of Taw-
hid [monotheism] in Nigeria.” 61
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Both the Nigerians who had trained abroad with the GSPC and those who 
had stayed with Yusuf in Nigeria decided it was now time for them to begin 
a jihad. The issue was how to succeed. By 2009, al-Qaeda had established an 
affiliate in Iraq, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and used Iraq as a base to deepen 
relationships with Algerians in AQIM who traveled to Iraq to fight. Al-Qa-
eda also deepened its relationship with al-Shabab in Somalia via its Yemen-
based affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).62 Therefore, the 
Nigerian Taliban was no longer forced to liaise with al-Qaeda in Pakistan 
via couriers like it had done in 2003; it could instead liaise with al-Qaeda’s 
regional hubs, AQIM and al-Shabab.
Al-Qaeda had prepared its organizational structure for this “opportunity” 
in Nigeria, but could it succeed? What came next was a major adapta-
tion: Shekau, Yusuf ’s successor, took advantage of over a decade of Nige-
rian Taliban-GSPC/AQIM contacts to seek support in moving from the 
“preaching,” or dawa, phase, to the jihad phase.
Shekau and AQIM Connect
Shekau had been shot in the leg in the July 2009 clashes and declared dead, 
but unbeknownst to the security forces, his followers rescued him.63 His 
first action was to operationalize the previous ties to AQIM and send Kha-
lid al-Barnawi and two other militants to meet with AQIM commander 
for the Sahel, Abu Zeid, who ran the training camps for Nigerian Taliban 
members. They met in the days after the July 2009 clashes to, in Abu Zeid’s 
words, “consult on waging jihad in Nigeria.” Abu Zeid, who knew the three 
militants already, relayed their requests to AQIM leader Abu Musab Abdul 
Wadud, who then reported about the meeting to bin Laden in Pakistan.64 
The outcome of this meeting with Abu Zeid was a key turning point for 
the Nigerian Taliban. The meeting showed the value for JAS of partnering 
with AQIM, which for years had been extending its reach into sub-Saharan 
West Africa. AQIM would provide JAS with the resources it needed to 
launch the “guerilla war” that Shekau requested help with.
The meeting—and AQIM’s support for JAS—changed JAS’s trajectory in 
five important ways: narratives, communications, coordination, finances, 
and training.
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Narratives 
First, through public statements, al-Qaeda made clear that the former 
Nigerian Taliban—the new JAS—was part of its network. AQIM initially 
publicly welcomed JAS into the al-Qaeda network. In August 2009—days 
after the meeting with Abu Zeid—an AQIM statement said “the killing of 
Yusuf was proof of a Crusader war against Islam.” In February 2010, AQIM 
leader Abdul Wadud issued a statement calling on Nigerian Muslims to 
fight “the Crusaders” in the same way that al-Shabab was fighting Ethiopian 
troops in Somalia, promising to provide the “Nigerian mujahidin” with 
“men, arms, and ammunition” to “defend” Nigerian Muslims against the al-
leged “Christian minority.”65 Just before the one-year anniversary of Yusuf ’s 
death, AQIM’s own media agency, al-Andalus, released a statement from 
Shekau declaring jihad against Nigeria and the U.S. and expressing support 
for al-Qaeda, thus disproving claims that he was dead (and embarrassing 
the Nigerian security forces who at first called the images of Shekau to 
appear after July 2009 a “digital manipulation”).66 On the one-year anniver-
sary of Yusuf ’s death, al-Shabab and AQI offered condolences to JAS. 
JAS, for its part, released several low-quality videos on YouTube in 2010 
and early 2011 with support from Nigerians who trained in media with 
AQIM. In particular, JAS created nasheeds,67 or Islamic chants, in Hausa 
folk style to venerate Shekau and compare him to other global jihadist lead-
ers such as Bin Laden and al-Zarqawi. One nasheed, for example, said: 
Greetings to you, Abubakar Shekau, the hero, the masquerade [fearful figure] 
to the Jews. Shekau, the hater of Jews, masquerade for the infidels and a big 
problem for the white race [Western nations]. Oh people, our name is al-
Qaeda, if you are looking for terrorists, we are here and we are telling you,  
we hate the Americans.68 
Other nasheeds called Shekau a “lion” and a “scholar,” called out Izala for 
believing that “politics [democracy] are better than prayers [Islam],” denied 
that JAS was khawarij,69 as Izala claimed, and promised revenge for Yusuf ’s 
murder and the imprisonment of JAS members and their kin.70 Shekau was 
focused on building a cult of personality around his leadership in Nigeria to 
the exclusion of other JAS members, such as Mamman Nur, who had begun 
training with AQIM and al-Shabab. By focusing on revenge for the July 
2009 clashes and near-enemy themes, such as the “infidelity” of the Nige-
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rian state, while embracing—and enjoying legitimacy from—al-Qaeda, 
Shekau ensured that he would remain the most relevant JAS leader. The 
more experienced, transnational militants like Nur, Khalid al-Barnawi, and 
Adam Kambar would, in contrast, be strictly operational.
Communications 
The second result of the meeting with Abu Zeid was that AQIM set up a 
line of communication between Shekau and bin Laden, which Khalid al-
Barnawi requested. In a letter sent to bin Laden, Shekau said he wanted to 
“learn the system of the organization,” although this did not lead to formal 
affiliation.71 By 2010, bin Laden was cautious in promoting new affiliates 
after having seen how AQI’s excessive violence harmed al-Qaeda’s reputa-
tion due to the failure to properly vet its leader, al-Zarqawi. Furthermore, 
back-channel communications and a low-profile relationship between 
al-Qaeda, JAS, and al-Qaeda allies could reduce international counterin-
surgent pressure on them. If JAS was known as “al-Qaeda in Nigeria,” such 
pressure would only increase.72 
Coordination 
Third, AQIM set up an intermediary between AQIM and JAS in Niger. 
Abu Zeid said at the meeting “communications via Internet and phone 
… would be easy to manage,” although he noted the intermediary would 
“have a short lifespan.” 73 The intermediary, Adam Kambar, who had been 
arrested but released in 2007 for his involvement with the GSPC, had the 
experience and trust of AQIM and after Bin Laden’s death in 2011, would 
develop a line of communication to al-Zawahiri and al-Shabab. 74 
Finances
Fourth, AQIM provided a $250,000 “investment” to kidnap foreign 
engineers in Nigeria, in order to press Western governments on al-Qaeda’s 
political demands and to receive ransoms to share with AQIM.75 It ap-
pears this order came from bin Laden, who had instructed AQIM to give 
200,000 euro (then the equivalent of $250,000) to Yunus al-Mauritani, 
who was a former GSPC member and became the head of the al-Qaeda 
External Operations Unit for Africa after Harun’s arrest. Al-Mauritani then 
likely gave the money to Kambar and Khalid al-Barnawi.76 
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Training 
The fifth, and final, result of the meeting with Abu Zeid was that AQIM 
would provide “practical trainings” (as opposed to what Abu Zeid consid-
ered to be “theoretical [ideological] trainings”) to JAS fighters in the Sahel. 
This was in response to Khalid al-Barnawi’s request for training of JAS 
fighters in intervals of 200 fighters at a time.
After the meeting, therefore, JAS was set to bring terrorism to Nigeria in a 
way the country had never seen and did not expect. But like any transition, 
things do not always go according to plan—even when the plan succeeds. 
The Nigerian AQIM veterans who received the money from and main-
tained direct contact with AQIM, led by Khalid al-Barnawi, had their own 
ideas on how AQIM’s support should be used in Nigeria, while Shekau had 
other ideas. The former group preferred targeting the “far enemy” 77 in Ni-
geria (i.e., Western interests or international organizations), while the latter 
sought to target almost exclusively the “near enemy” in Nigeria (i.e., the 
Nigerian government, Nigerians Muslims associated with the government, 
and Christians). While at first Nigerian AQIM veterans would operate 
under the JAS banner and under Shekau’s leadership, their strategic differ-
ences on issues such as the “far enemy” and “near enemy” began to reflect 
broader ideological differences in a way that made the relationship unsus-
tainable. As a result, a new group, Ansaru, led by Khalid al-Barnawi, would 
ultimately split from both JAS factions. 
The following section shows the risks that came along with AQIM invest-
ing in a group whose leader, Shekau, was not properly vetted, just as with al-
Zarqawi. The friction with JAS—especially directly with Shekau—would 
force AQIM to reassess the relationship altogether. 
Discussion Questions
1.  To what extent was it a challenge in Nigeria that even leading preachers 
who rejected Yusuf ’s core teachings nonetheless showed admiration for 
al-Qaeda? How was it a problem for Nigeria that there was a general dis-
trust in the government about its terrorism prosecutions? What are ways 
that Nigeria could remedy this “credibility gap”? 
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2.  To what extent was Muhammed Yusuf an “extremist,” given that he was 
competing among the highest echelons of Islamic leadership in northern 
Nigeria? How can this term be misleading, or useful? Moreover, how 
can governments deal with groups that are extremist and aspire to violent 
jihad, but are, at least temporarily, mostly nonviolent and focused on 
preaching, spreading their message, and recruitment?
3.  What indications existed that the crackdown in 2009 could have much 
different results that the crackdown in 2004? How could Nigeria have 
better handled the helmet issue? Moreover, in terms of leadership, based 
on the brief samples of Mamman Nur and Shekau, how might their per-
spectives on waging a jihad after 2009 differ?
4.  What do the early nasheeds about Shekau suggest about his leadership 
style and those who follow him? How does this “internal” JAS mes-
saging differ from Shekau’s or AQIM’s “externally” focused messaging, 
and why? 
5.  The meeting between Khalid al-Barnawi and two other militants with 
Abu Zeid immediately after the July 2009 clashes, AQIM’s posting of a 
Shekau statement on an online forum, and Shekau’s correspondences to 
Bin Laden suggest a high-level leadership relationship between Shekau 
and al-Qaeda and ease access of communication between them even 
before any post-July 2009 violence had broken out. What could this 
suggest for the prospects of terrorism in Nigeria after July 2009? What 
factors would have contributed to the likelihood of violence by JAS? 
What could be done to prevent, or mitigate, the potential for violence at 
this stage?
6.  Is there a paradox that (1) al-Qaeda “welcomed” JAS publicly into its 
network after 2009, (2) but maintained a low enough profile about the 
relationship so as to not make JAS a formal affiliate, while (3) also having 
a strategy to provoke or overextend the West in Nigeria?  Are there times 
when al-Qaeda wants to provoke and other times when it wants to be 
“left alone”? 
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    CHAPTER 
TWO
AQIM Enters Nigeria
It was Eid al-Adha in Bauchi State on September 7, 2010, and Muslims 
filtered into the mosque from around Bauchi city for evening prayers. The 
worshippers were so many that rows of men extended from the mosque’s 
courtyard into the streets until their backs were against the city’s main 
prison walls, nearly 500 meters away. As worshippers prostrated, 50 men 
leapt up, declaring, “We’re not here to kill anyone, only to free our fol-
lowers ...” They shot AK-47s into the air, tackled the imam, and detonated 
explosives around the prison walls—just high enough to open holes to run 
through, but small enough so the walls didn’t collapse and force them to 
climb mounds of concrete to enter the prison. In total, the attackers freed 
750 prisoners, including 150 of Yusuf ’s followers who had been detained 
during the July 2009 clashes.78
JAS claimed responsibility for the prison break and warned of more attacks 
to come in pamphlets released in Bauchi the day after the attack, demonstrat-
ing its new capability to combine militancy with strategic communication. 
For the Nigerian security forces, the Bauchi prison break was a wake-up 
call. It quickly became apparent that the Nigerian Taliban had not been 
crushed in the 2009 uprising: it had only been hibernating and re-emerged 
as JAS. The statements from AQIM, AQI, al-Shabab, and Shekau after 
Yusuf ’s death had not been just rhetoric but a call to action. JAS was on the 
verge of becoming a more organized, more capable, and more violent suc-
cessor of the Nigerian Taliban. 
JAS attacks would only escalate over the next two years from late 2010 to 
late 2012 in northern Nigeria. But for al-Qaeda, which finally sought its 
plan for Nigeria realized, this development was not all good: while AQIM 
did not oppose “near enemy” attacks, it was Shekau’s tolerance—and 
even enthusiasm—for killing “apostates,” which he broadly interpreted 
to include Muslim civilians who participated in democracy, that forced 
al-Qaeda to recoil. Al-Qaeda had been trying cleanse itself of the image of 
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killing innocent civilians, like al-Zarqawi’s atrocities in Iraq. Shekau would 
prove to be a liability.    
The perpetrators of attacks from 2012-2012 can be categorized into the  
following three entities with their corresponding areas of operations: 
 •  The JAS Shekau faction carried out attacks in Borno, Yobe, Adama-
wa, Bauchi, and Gombe, or “northeastern Nigeria”;
 •  The JAS AQIM faction included the rest of northern Nigeria, such 
as the capital of Abuja, and Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Jigawa, Kaduna, 
Zamfara, Nassarawa, Niger, Taraba, and Plateau; and
 •  Ansaru, which operated in roughly the same areas as the JAS AQIM 
faction.
Kano—northern Nigeria’s largest city and the geographic, political, eco-
nomic, and religious center of the region —was a “mutual area of operations” 
in which both JAS factions and Ansaru interacted but also clashed. The next 
Figure 2.1. Locations of attacks by JAS and Ansaru from 2010-2012
section investigates the role, membership, strategies, and evolution of the 
JAS Shekau faction, the JAS AQIM faction, and Ansaru. As you read it, 
consider the following:
 •  In 2010, there were only around a dozen attacks after the Bauchi 
prison break, and virtually all were in the AO of the JAS Shekau 
faction.
 •  In 2011, there were 69 attacks in the AO of the JAS Shekau faction 
and 9 attacks in the AO of the JAS AQIM faction and Ansaru.
 •  In 2012, Nigeria saw 419 attacks credibly attributed to JAS and 
Ansaru. Approximately 70% (289 attacks) were in the AO of the JAS 
Shekau faction and approximately 14% (59 attacks) were in the AO  
of the JAS AQIM faction and Ansaru (including the majority, 39  
attacks, in Kaduna). Approximately 16% (71 attacks) were in the  
mutual AO in Kano. These percentages were similar to those of 2011.
The JAS Shekau Faction
In the two years after the Bauchi prison break, attacks gradually increased in 
the JAS Shekau faction’s AO, becoming an almost daily occurrence. These at-
Figure 2.2. JAS, JAS AQIM, and Ansaru attacks 2010-2012
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tacks tended to be assassinations of Muslim religious leaders, especially Salaf-
ists, who opposed JAS and of civil servants, as well as bombings of prisons, 
banks, churches, and beer halls or other “un-Islamic” places where civilians 
congregated. There were few large-scale or sophisticated attacks that required 
high-level training or that gained national-level attention. 
Two attacks, however, were notable exceptions: the “urban invasions” in 
Damatru, Yobe’s capital, in November 2011 and a January 2012 attack in 
Kano. Dozens of fighters choked off the main traffic arteries in both cities 
and attacked government facilities. Both attacks resulted in large numbers 
of civilian casualties, with up to 100 and 200 killed in Damatru and Kano, 
respectively, although government officials were the main targets. The Kano 
attack was pre-warned, ordered, and claimed by Shekau, who was based 
there at the time of the attack, and the belongings of the attackers who died 
showed signs that they had been reading AQI bomb-making manuals.
The indiscriminate violence in the Shekau faction attacks, especially the 
targeting of Salafi preachers who opposed—or were even neutral toward—
JAS, was a cause of concern for some former Nigerian Taliban members, 
let alone AQIM. One group calling itself the Yusufiya Islamic Movement 
issued pamphlets in Maiduguri saying it was:
concerned that some people with evil motives have infiltrated our genuine 
struggle with a false jihad that is un-Islamic. We therefore distance our group 
from all the bombings targeted at civilians and other establishments and 
equally condemn them … This is necessary in the light of genuine concern by 
individuals and groups to the mass suffering of innocent citizens caught in the 
crossfire between our members and the Nigerian troops.79 
Damatru was JAS’s first attack that saw significant civilian casualties, and 
al-Qaeda supporters subsequently expressed concern about JAS’s killings. 
The rise in al-Qaeda interest, and concern, about JAS came after the senior 
al-Qaida leader responsible for external operations, Abu Yahya al-Libi, 
credited AQIM with training JAS, whose spokesmen for Shekau at the 
time, Abu Qaqa, who was freed in the Bauchi prison break, openly admit-
ted a relationship with al-Qaeda.80 One al-Qaeda supporter said that JAS 
attacks would lead to a backlash that would alienate innocent Muslims 
or cause them to be attacked by Christians and the government. Another 
AQIM member nonetheless claimed that JAS was “one of the fruits of 
the al-qaeda accelerant in boko haram’s rise  43
AQIM’s jihad” and took pride “that many of its fighters had trained in 
AQIM’s camps.” 81 
Although JAS attacks represented a low-grade insurgency, which was 
focused primarily on urban areas and showed that Shekau had a sufficient 
number of followers to carry out near-daily attacks, the violence predomi-
nantly affected people in Borno and Yobe. What Shekau had, therefore, 
was manpower—a large number of motivated fighters concentrated in 
northeastern Nigeria. However, the fighters neither demonstrated that they 
received training in sophisticated tactics nor that they were directed to tar-
get the types of international interests that would advance al-Qaeda’s stra-
tegic interests, such as furthering the narrative of the West and Christians 
engaging in a “Crusade” against Muslims, drawing the U.S. to overextend it-
self in Nigeria, or showing the Muslim world that al-Qaeda was fighting on 
a global battlefield and was capable of retaliating for U.S. attacks anywhere 
in the world. For Shekau, this may have been ideal—no one questioned 
or rivaled his leadership in northeastern Nigeria—but the growing risk in 
reputation from Shekau’s targeting of civilians and his exclusive focus on 
the “near enemy” made him a potential liability for AQIM. 
The JAS AQIM Faction 
The JAS AQIM faction differed from the Shekau faction in that it carried 
out almost of all its attacks along the Muslim-Christian “fault line” in Nige-
ria’s Middle Belt region. Moreover, a significant proportion of these attacks 
were suicide bombings. Of the 36 suicide attacks in Nigeria from June 2011 
until the end of 2012, 28 were in the JAS AQIM faction’s AO, and only 
four were in the Shekau faction’s AO (another four were in the mutual AO 
in Kano), even though there were nearly five times the attacks in the JAS 
Shekau faction’s AO (289 Shekau faction attacks vs. 59 AQIM faction at-
tacks). Thus, the specialty of the JAS AQIM faction was suicide bombings, 
with these attacks comprising more than 50% of its overall attacks com-
pared to 1% of the overall attacks of the JAS Shekau faction.
Moreover, of the 20 suicide car bombings in the JAS AQIM faction’s AO in 
2012, 11 targeted churches, including seven in Kaduna and three on Easter 
week in Kaduna in 2012. The other nine suicide car bombings tended to 
target government buildings or media that the JAS spokesman claimed were  
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reporting negatively about Islam. There were no “urban invasion” or attacks 
with dozens of fighters that were likely to cause mass civilian casualties beyond 
the immediate targets such as Christian worshippers or government officials. 
These JAS AQIM faction suicide attacks generated significant national 
and international attention. They involved a high level of sophistication in 
designing the suicide bombs and deploying them at relatively hard targets.82 
These attacks bore many of the “signatures” of AQIM—as promised by Ab-
dul Wadud in 2010—in that they targeted churches, especially on holidays 
such as Easter, and high-profile targets, such as the Federal Police building 
and UN Headquarters in Abuja, while also seeking to avoid Muslim civil-
ian casualties. The goal was not quantity, or frequency, as with the attacks 
in the JAS Shekau faction’s AO, but quality, as determined by al-Qaeda 
strategy. This can be explained by the fact that the key militants involved in 
those attacks had direct ties to AQIM. In contrast, the JAS Shekau faction, 
including Shekau and his closest commanders, stayed in northeastern Nige-
ria after July 2009 and were mostly indirect recipients of such support.
Below are four examples of attacks by the JAS AQIM faction in 2011 and 
2012, which also shed light on the profiles of key militants.
 •  December 24, 2010, saw the first major bombing in Nigeria in Jos, Pla-
teau State. It involved four simultaneous explosions plus one designed 
to explode once the rescue team came to save the wounded—a typical 
al-Qaeda tactic that had not been executed in Nigeria before—and 
was claimed by JAS.
 •  On June 16, 2011, a suicide car bomb exploded at the Federal Police 
building in Abuja—the first suicide bombing in the country’s his-
tory—killing three people. JAS had warned about the attack two days 
beforehand and said, “We want to make it known that our jihadists 
arrived in Nigeria from Somalia, where they received real training on 
warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable.” JAS 
member Abu Fatima claimed the attack and said the purpose was to 
“show that actions speak louder than words.” 83 
 •  On August 26, 2011, a suicide car bomb exploded at the UN Head-
quarters, killing 23 people. The mastermind behind it was Mamman 
Nur, who was Yusuf ’s third-in-command and had trained with AQIM 
and al-Shabab after the July 2009 clashes. He received support in the 
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operation from Abu Fatima and Adam Kambar, although the Shekau 
faction, which provided the car bomber, claimed the attack in a video 
with a voiceover of Shekau saying “The UN is the forum of all global 
evil.”84 This attack was the culmination of Ibrahim Harun’s long-stand-
ing ambition to target the U.S. or other diplomatic facilities in Abuja 
(there was a U.S. office in the headquarters). 
 •  On December 25, 2011, Muhammed Yusuf ’s former representative 
for Sokoto State, Kabiru Sokoto, masterminded the bombing of a 
church outside of Abuja, killing more than 20 worshippers. Sokoto 
was arrested in January 2012 in the lodge of the Borno State governor 
in Abuja, but escaped custody. He was re-arrested in Taraba State near 
the Cameroonian border one month later, when intelligence agents 
tracked his call to Shekau’s spokesman, Abu Qaqa. In his trial, Kabiru 
Sokoto confessed that his funding came “the group from the sunset” 
in Algeria and that he reported not to Shekau but to the “Shura” in 
Kaduna under Abu Muhammed.85 Abu Muhammed was a former 
trainee of Khalid al-Barnawi and Adam Kambar at an AQIM camp in 
the Sahel and one of the two militants who accompanied al-Barnawi 
to meet with Abu Zeid after Yusuf ’s death.
A closer look at these individuals shows that they were all connected to 
AQIM in a more direct way than Shekau (or Shekau’s closest commanders) 
and they tended to employ different tactics, techniques, and procedures 
than the JAS Shekau faction. Moreover, as evidenced by Kabiru Sokoto, 
although they operated under the umbrella of JAS and did not reject 
Shekau’s leadership, they distanced themselves geographically from the JAS 
Shekau faction, operated outside of northeastern Nigeria, and focused their 
attacks on “far enemy” targets around Abuja and the Middle Belt that min-
imized Muslim civilian casualties. In order to preserve unity, they did not 
defect from JAS and thus allowed Shekau and his spokesmen to take credit 
for their attacks. This gave the impression that JAS was one entity when, 
in fact, the JAS AQIM faction was largely operationally—and increasingly 
ideologically—distinct from the Shekau faction. 
In summary, direct ties to AQIM can be seen in the following: 
 •  Mamman Nur trained with al-Shabab and AQIM and disagreed with 
Shekau’s killing of civilians; 
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 •  Adam Kambar was arrested for training with the GSPC when he 
was a Nigerian Taliban member and then became the JAS-AQIM 
intermediary in Niger and had contact with Ayman al-Zawahiri and 
al-Shabab; 
 •  Abu Muhammed trained in an AQIM camp under Khalid al-Barnawi 
and Kambar and was with Khalid al-Barnawi when Shekau sent them 
to meet Abu Zeid after Muhammed Yusuf ’s death; 
 •  Kabiru Sokoto may not have met with AQIM, but he reported to Abu 
Muhammed and was in contact with Shekau’s spokesman, Abu Qaqa, 
who, like other members in the JAS AQIM faction, opposed Shekau’s 
acceptance of Muslim civilian deaths and fled from Borno State to 
Kaduna State in 2012;86
 •  Abu Fatima was a member of the JAS AQIM faction (and later joined 
Ansaru, which suggests that he must have opposed Shekau’s killing 
of civilians, as that was Ansaru’s main complaint against Shekau). He 
received training in bomb-making, perhaps with AQIM or from the 
fighters who he said “arrived from Somalia,” since he would become a 
commander of suicide bombings for Ansaru. His claim about mili-
tants who “arrived from Somalia” was verified not only by Nur’s and 
Kambar’s close contact with Abu Fatima and their contacts to al-
Shabab (and AQIM), but also by the arrests of two militants several 
days before the Nur-masterminded UN building attack. One of the 
two militants had trained in Somalia with al-Shabab; the other had 
been arrested with Kambar in 2006 on charges of training with the 
GSPC but, like Kambar, was released.87 Moreover, Abu Fatima and 
Nur would later become close allies, and together they would oppose 
Shekau’s killing of civilians in West Africa Province. 
As is clear, although the JAS AQIM faction attacks were more sporadic 
than those of the JAS Shekau faction, their impact was consistent with 
AQIM’s overall goals. This left AQIM with a conundrum: the JAS Shekau 
faction had the manpower to engage in a large-scale insurgency but did 
not show a willingness to adopt AQIM targeting preferences, while the 
JAS AQIM faction was capable of carrying out terrorist attacks consistent 
with AQIM’s targeting preferences but lacked the manpower to support 
an insurgency. Moreover, since Shekau established himself as the sole 
JAS leader and was willing to kill anyone who criticized him or defected, 
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including even from his own faction to the JAS AQIM faction, AQIM had 
little leverage to influence JAS at the leadership level. The successes of the 
JAS AQIM faction, such as the suicide attack at the UN building, were 
offset by the risks of JAS being seen as a jihadist movement that excessively 
targeted civilians, just like the GIA.
AQIM would ultimately prioritize its brand reputation over its potential to 
expand the insurgency with a JAS that had Shekau at the helm. It supported 
the emergence of a new faction—Ansaru—that pulled in some elements of 
the JAS AQIM faction. But this came with the inherent risk of Ansaru being 
too small in membership, too marginal in the context of the wider insur-
gency, and too pressured from Shekau to have the impact AQIM needed to 
sustain a jihadist movement in Nigeria.
Ansaru 
Ansaru emerged at first not so much as an ideological counterweight to 
JAS but out of the different operational preferences of Khalid al-Barnawi 
and Shekau. A member of proto-al-Qaeda since the 1990s in Sudan and 
then with al-Shabab and AQIM (and their predecessors) in the 2000s, 
Khalid al-Barnawi had a distinct focus on “far enemy” targets, especially 
kidnappings.88 Thus, when he received the $250,000 from AQIM after the 
meeting with Abu Zeid in August 2009, he transferred it to Abu Mu-
hammed, who set up a base in Nigeria’s Kaduna State. (Al-Barnawi moved 
between Nigeria and the Sahel.) 
As a militant with direct ties to AQIM, Abu Muhammed was naturally an 
ally of the JAS AQIM faction, as evidenced by his role in directing Kabiru 
Sokoto in the Christmas 2011 church bombing. While Shekau condoned 
but did not order the JAS AQIM faction attacks, Abu Muhammed also 
ventured into a tactical area that Shekau explicitly rejected: kidnappings-
for-ransom of foreigners. This was the tactic that AQIM had intended 
for JAS to carry out with its initial $250,000 investment given to Khalid 
al-Barnawi. It was in this context that the first kidnapping operation that 
Khalid al-Barnawi masterminded with Abu Muhammed led to not merely 
a factional split but opened an organizational split with Shekau.
This first kidnapping-for-ransom operation occurred when a cell directed 
by Abu Muhammed kidnapped a British and an Italian engineer from their 
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apartment in Kebbi State in May 2011, taking them to a hideout in neigh-
boring Sokoto State. Just as the JAS AQIM faction carried out the first 
suicide attack in Nigerian history, this was the first major kidnapping-for-
ransom of foreigners in northern Nigeria.89 (Southern Nigeria, in contrast, 
often saw economically motivated kidnappings of oil workers.) Although 
suspicion fell on JAS, Shekau’s spokesman, Abu Qaqa, called allegations of 
JAS involvement “ridiculous” and said, “We have never been involved in 
hostage-taking and it is not part of our style, and we never ask for ransom.” 90 
A new group called al-Qaeda in the Lands Beyond the Sahel (AQLBS) 
claimed the kidnapping in a proof-of-life video showing the two hostages 
blindfolded and kneeling in front of three veiled militants wearing Sahelian 
clothing typical of AQIM militants. The video was sent to Mauritania’s 
Agence Nouakchott d’information, which commonly received AQIM hos-
tage videos, and the hostage-takers contacted the same Burkina Faso-based 
Mauritanian negotiator that AQIM used in several previous kidnappings. 
They demanded $6 million and the release of jihadist prisoners in West 
Africa for the two hostages, which was also consistent with AQIM’s typical 
demands. The realization of this kidnapping reflected the vision of AQIM 
to expand its zone of operations “throughout the entire Sahara,” even 
though at first analysts doubted whether it was truly an al-Qaeda operation 
and not just “ordinary criminals.” 91 
The two hostages ultimately were killed in a rescue attempt in March 
2012, one day after a raid of Abu Muhammed’s base in Kaduna that killed 
Muhammed and provided intelligence leading the security forces to the 
hideout in Sokoto State. Intelligence from the raid also led the security 
forces to a hideout in Kano, where a German engineer, who was kidnapped 
on January 26, 2012, was being held. This kidnapping was claimed by 
AQIM—not AQLBS— because Adam Kambar had masterminded the 
operation and informed Abu Zeid and AQIM leadership about it before-
hand. In the kidnapping in Kebbi-Sokoto, Khalid al-Barnawi operated with 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who was part of AQIM but separate from its leader-
ship hierarchy. 
In AQIM’s claim of the kidnapping in Kano, it demanded Germany 
release Filiz Gelowicz from prison in Germany. She was the Turkey-born 
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wife of a German convert to Islam, who fought for the Taliban in Af-
ghanistan and was arrested in 2007 in Germany for planning to bomb 
Ramstein Air Base on orders from the Yunus al-Mauritani-led al-Qaeda’s 
External Operations Unit—the same unit to which Ibrahim Harun 
belonged. This demand came at a time when al-Qaeda was engaging in a 
global messaging campaign to free female prisoners, including Filiz Gelo-
wicz, and showed that AQIM was now capable of extending al-Qaeda’s 
narratives and the “global battlefield” to Nigeria, which had been part of 
the original strategy for Nigeria. AQIM also reminded Germany to avoid 
the “recent lesson taught to the UK by the mujahidin,” referring to UK 
special forces, which assisted Nigerian security forces in the failed rescue 
attempt of the British and Italian hostages in Sokoto.92 Although Germa-
ny did release Filiz Gelowicz early, the German engineer was not released. 
He was killed in a rescue attempt in May 2012 along with his captors, 
two of whom were Mauritanian AQIM members.93
Although these kidnappings in Kebbi-Sokoto and Kano in the names 
of AQLBS and AQIM were not claimed by Ansaru, their tie to Khalid 
al-Barnawi, Adam Kambar, and Abu Muhammed shows they were part of 
the group that would in 2012 call itself Ansaru. Moreover, the two kidnap-
pings showed that elements of the JAS AQIM faction, especially Abu Mu-
hammed, were increasingly moving away from the JAS umbrella, toward a 
new organizational structure. Ansaru would not only carry out operations 
that were geographically and tactically distinct from the JAS Shekau fac-
tion but also call out JAS for its indiscriminate violence.  
Ansaru officially announced its formation in fliers dropped in Kano on 
January 26, 2012—the same day the German engineer was kidnapped and 
one week after the Shekau-claimed “urban invasion” attack in Kano. The 
fliers said Ansaru was a “humane” alternative to JAS and sought to revive 
the caliphate of Usman dan Fodio—the Fulani jihadist who established a 
caliphate in the northwestern Nigeria in the 1800s.94 Videos in June 2012 
showed that Ansaru disapproved of Shekau’s killing of Muslims, includ-
ing Ansaru defectors from JAS (although Ansaru did not mention Shekau 
specifically by name),95 and that it bore some of legacies of the GSPC, such 
as including a logo modeled on GSPC (and Algeria’s national emblem), its 
use of Arabic, and its fighters’ tendency to wear Sahelian attire in its visual 
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propaganda. Like AQIM leader Abdul Wadud’s 2010 threats, Ansaru also 
specifically promised revenge for Christian “atrocities” against Muslims in 
Nigeria’s Middle Belt. 
Al-Qaeda explained five years later in a January 2017 article that JAS had 
elected Shekau as amir (ruler) of their jamaah (group) after Muhammed 
Yusuf ’s death in 2009.96 However, they saw how Shekau declared anyone 
who was not part of their jamaah as apostates, including ordinary Mus-
lims who neither joined nor opposed JAS: this was tantamount to the 
same declaration of takfir that the GIA had declared on Algerians during 
that country’s civil war in the 1990s. As a result, the militants who formed 
Ansaru, including Khalid al-Barnawi, consulted their “Algerian brothers,” 
separated from Shekau, and chose the name Ansaru. Removing “al-Qaeda” 
from their name was likely in response to bin Laden and later AQIM direc-
tives for al-Qaeda affiliates and allies to disguise their “jihadist intentions” 
and appear as local or “nationalist” movements to reduce international 
counterterrorism attention on them. Ansaru’s membership thus came from 
Nigerian AQIM members who returned to Nigeria, such as Khalid al-Bar-
nawi, Adam Kambar, and Abu Muhammed; Nigerians recruited abroad, 
such as in Islamic universities in Sudan who trained with Abu Zeid or Bel-
mokhtar and were then deployed to Nigeria; and defectors from JAS, such 
as Shekau’s spokesman, Abu Qaqa, and Abu Fatima, who became Ansaru 
commander for suicide operations. 
After a series of statements and videos, the group claimed its first opera-
tion under “Ansaru” in November 26, 2012, when its militants broke into 
a prison in Abuja, freed several dozen prisoners, and issued a YouTube 
video with a popular Arabic jihadist nasheed claiming the attack.97 Ansaru 
claimed its second operation on December 19, 2012, when 30 militants 
kidnapped a French engineer from a town in Katsina State in northwest-
ern Nigeria near the border with Niger. Ansaru said it would continue to 
kidnap French citizens until France ended its ban on the hijab for women 
and abandoned its then imminent plans to intervene militarily in northern 
Mali to oust AQIM and its allies, who were controlling northern Mali. The 
Frenchman escaped custody after being moved to Kaduna State in Novem-
ber 2013, several weeks after Ansaru showed a proof-of-life video of him on 
a jihadist website.98 
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Ansaru’s kidnapping victims after the French engineer were not as fortu-
nate. On February 16, 2013, Ansaru kidnapped seven foreign engineers 
from a construction site in Bauchi State—its first operation in the JAS 
Shekau faction AO. Before Ansaru killed the seven engineers several weeks 
later, it warned that any attempt to rescue the hostages would lead to the 
same result as in the Kebbi-Sokoto and Kano kidnappings (claimed by 
AQLBS and AQIM) and said the kidnapping was in response to European 
“atrocities” in Afghanistan and Mali. In the video Ansaru released of the 
dead Baluchi captives, a militant voiceover said the group killed the “seven 
Christian foreigners” due to Nigerian media reports that UK and Nigeri-
ans forces were preparing a rescue mission.99 Both the theme of the hijab 
in France and the focus on Afghanistan and Mali, as well as Ansaru’s use 
of Arabic as its main language communication, reflected broader al-Qaeda 
and AQIM messaging, unlike Shekau’s more Nigeria-centric messages at 
this time.
In addition to these kidnappings and the prison break, Ansaru also claimed 
an ambush in south of Abuja in Kogi State on Nigerian troops who were 
preparing for deployment to Mali, killing two soldiers. Ansaru said the 
troops “were aiming to demolish the Islamic Empire of Mali” and warned 
African countries to “stop helping Western countries fight Muslims.” 100 
Again, this claim fit al-Qaeda “global narratives” but appealed less to spe-
cific Nigerian concerns.
Beyond Nigeria, Ansaru members were active in northern Mali, which 
came under the control of AQIM and allied groups in April 2012. 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s al-Murabitun and MUJWA, for example, featured 
an Ansaru member in their joint claim of suicide attacks on French energy 
plants in May 2013 in Arlit and Agadez, Niger, which they said were in 
retaliation for French-led intervention in northern Mali.101 In addition, 
after Belmokhtar fled northern Mali in early 2013, an Ansaru propaganda 
flier was found in his home, suggesting a role for him in hosting Ansaru 
members and designing Ansaru propaganda in the town of Gao, northern 
Mali. This might account for the similarity between the themes of Ansaru’s 
claims and Belmokhtar’s and MUJWA’s claims. 102 AQIM ideologues, such 
as Abu Mundhir al-Shinqiti, who had been the mentor of some Ansaru 
members during their training in his native Mauritania, also condemned 
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some of JAS’s attacks (without mentioning Shekau or JAS by name), such 
as JAS’s series of killings of students in their classes or dormitories instead 
of burning down the school facilities after hours or warning their parents, 
which al-Shinqiti suggested could achieve the same result with less harm to 
the image of jihadists. 103 Indeed, al-Qaeda’s overall strategy by the time of 
al-Shinqiti’s statement in July 2013 was to avoid the perception of killing 
Muslims, which was consistent with al-Shinqiti’s and Ansaru’s messaging—
but not Shekau’s. 
While AQIM benefitted from the JAS AQIM faction and had an even 
more direct tie to Ansaru, both groups still lacked manpower compared to 
the JAS Shekau faction. Indeed, if it was the July 2009 clashes that moti-
vated many JAS fighters to take up jihad, then it was Shekau’s consistent de-
mands for revenge against the Nigerian government and its alleged collabo-
rators, including Muslims who participated in democracy, Christians, and 
the West, that kept them motivated. The JAS AQIM faction leaders and 
Ansaru leaders, who had spent years abroad before the clashes July 2009 
or trained abroad in their immediate aftermath, had less resonance than 
Shekau, even given his histrionics. Shekau’s bombast and use of Kanuri as 
well as Hausa and Arabic (and English or French when mocking the West) 
appealed to the “small boys” of northeastern Nigeria who saw Shekau as a 
“small boy” who grew important enough to have the “U.S. president calling 
him by name,” according to Nigeria’s former director of behavior analysis in 
its CVE program.104 
There appeared to be nothing AQIM could do to overcome Shekau, except 
continue reinforcing Ansaru and the JAS AQIM faction. But once AQIM 
itself came under pressure in northern Mali, it was forced to abandon its 
investment in Nigeria altogether. This would show that AQIM made the 
wrong wager in the short term, especially as the same members of Ansaru 
and the JAS AQIM faction in which AQIM invested fell into Shekau’s orbit 
and a new investor—Islamic State—came along to swallow them. But would 
AQIM’s disciplined commitment to staying away from Shekau’s takfirism 
prove wise in the long term? The next section discusses the short- and long-
term effects of AQIM’s loss of its investment in Nigeria.
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Discussion Questions
1.  What explains AQIM’s mixed support for the JAS Shekau faction attacks? 
2.  How may Shekau’s belief that Muslims who participate in democracy 
are “apostates” on the same level as Christian “infidels” have led him to 
have a different targeting strategy and preferences than AQIM (recall the 
prior discussion on takfirism and the GIA)? 
3.  If Shekau’s fighters were mostly Kanuris, how might this have affected 
the targeting strategy and areas of operations of his faction compared to 
the JAS AQIM faction, whose members were more likely to have trav-
eled abroad after the July 2009 clashes and been from other Nigerian 
ethnicities?
4.  How did the four attacks profiled above support the overall al-Qaeda 
strategy for Nigeria?
5.  To what extent were the much fewer suicide bombings in the AO of the 
JAS Shekau faction compared to the JAS AQIM faction related to differ-
ences in ideology or levels of training between the two factions? 
6.  The words “terrorism” and “insurgency” have been used interchangeably, 
especially in the Nigerian context. To what extent would distinguishing 
between these terms—and the types of violence seen in 2012 in the areas 
of operations of the JAS Shekau faction and JAS AQIM faction—become 
relevant in develop a strategy to counter JAS?
7.  How do the different backgrounds of Khalid al-Barnawi and Shekau re-
flect their “near enemy” vs. “far enemy” approaches? 
8.  What does AQIM’s relationship to both JAS factions and Ansaru suggest 
about the potential risks, or difficulties, in al-Qaeda’s expansion into Nige-
ria or any other country? What was the role of AQIM and other outside 
actors in the evolution of both JAS factions and Ansaru?  
9.  Did the JAS Shekau faction, the JAS AQIM faction, or Ansaru pose the 
biggest threat? What metrics would one use to assess this? How does the 
answer depend on who is assessing the threat, such as the Nigerian govern-
ment, an international NGO or company, or the U.S. government? 
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From AQIM to ISIS
“We took the barracks and we control all of the town of Konna!” 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s brother-in-law and leader of MUJWA, Oumar 
Ould Hamaha, told reporters on January 10, 2013.105 Militants in MU-
JWA under the command of the ethnically Fulani jihadist Hamadou 
Kufa took control of the central Malian town of Konna, which was the 
gateway to southern Mali. Fears grew that MUJWA could now make a 
push for Bamako, Mali’s capital.
The rebel plan for Konna was a mastery of deceit. At the checkpoint for 
vehicles entering the city, 20 militants dressed in civilian clothing acted as 
if they were passengers. When a soldier went inside the bus to inspect their 
documents, they pulled out their guns, shot the soldier, and shot the other 
soldiers manning the checkpoint. Hundreds of MUJWA, AQIM, and An-
sar Dine fighters then stormed into the town and captured it.
France was already preparing to oust AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJWA 
from their strongholds in northern Mali, but once the militants entered 
Konna, the French expedited the intervention, which was code-named Op-
eration Serval. Starting in February 2013, French forces ousted the jihadists 
from northern Mali within weeks. Supported by Chadian special forces in 
remote regions, they killed Abu Zeid and Oumar Ould Hamaha and forced 
Belmokhtar and the remainder of Abu Zeid’s forces to retreat toward the 
Libya-Tunisia border. MUJWA members also dispersed in northern Mali 
and neighboring countries, while Ansar Dine retreated into the hinterlands 
of northern Mali to plan for long-term guerilla warfare. 
But the ouster of AQIM and its allies from northern Mali, which they had 
occupied since early 2012, disrupted the network of secret hideouts, logis-
tics bases, and training camps that AQIM had developed over the course 
of a decade of its expansion into the Sahel. For the JAS AQIM faction and 
Ansaru, this had significant implications: what would the JAS AQIM fac-
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tion and Ansaru do now that their key couriers to AQIM had been killed 
or arrested? Could Ansaru survive while AQIM was on the run, especially 
in the face of Shekau’s crackdown on Ansaru members in Nigeria? Could 
the JAS AQIM faction maintain its pace of suicide bombings without 
AQIM tactical support and guidance, let alone funding and training? And 
what would this mean for Shekau, who was the least dependent on AQIM 
of all Nigerian groups and factions—could this even be a boon for him? 
One month after the capture of Konna and the start of Operation Serval, 
in March 2013, a new tactic appeared in northeastern Nigeria in the JAS 
Shekau faction area of operations. For the first time, militants raided a mili-
tary barracks in Monguno, Borno State—a natural entry point for militants 
from Mali. Although they were repelled, according to a video the militants 
released, they were able to pilfer weapons. There was something else new 
about these militants: they claimed neither to be JAS nor Ansaru nor any 
previously known militant group. The leader said the group name was 
Nassiruddeen Li Ahlil jihad Alal Kitab Was Sunna (Islamic Victors Com-
mitted to the Qur’an and Sunna). They wore green camouflage uniforms 
and spoke Hausa like JAS, but wore veils like Ansaru, and used an attack 
strategy using convoys of improvised 4×4s common to the desert warfare of 
Mali. Moreover, the leader’s speech centered on fighting not in the name of 
any “tribe or clan, but to impose Islam on unbelievers”: the first part of this 
slogan was common to the AQIM militants in Mali, who sought to over-
come tribal differences to become the overlords of the insurgency there; 
and the second part was common to Shekau. Could AQIM or Ansaru 
militants who fled Mali have combined with Ansaru and JAS to launch this 
attack? Was this a sign of things to come?
Statistically, there were key differences between the militancy in Nigeria 
before and after Operation Serval. In 2013, there were 160 attacks in the 
JAS Shekau faction AO and only 10 in the JAS AQIM faction and Ansaru 
AO, which was a decrease from 289 and 59 attacks, respectively, in 2012. 
In 2013, there were also 35 attacks in Kano, the mutual area of opera-
tions, which was a decrease from 79 in 2012. Moreover, there were only 
two suicide operations in all of 2013 in Nigeria—a sharp reduction from 
the 29 suicide operations in 2012. Of course, the downturn in attacks in 
Nigeria could be attributed to other factors beyond Operation Serval, such 
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as a state of emergency military offensive that the Nigerian government 
declared in May 2013, as well as the arrests and deaths of key leaders in the 
JAS AQIM faction and Ansaru in Nigeria throughout 2012.
But the following section discusses several reasons why the second-order 
effects of Operation Serval mattered for Nigeria and suggests that the new 
tactics and alliances emerging between the JAS Shekau faction and JAS 
AQIM faction and Ansaru specifically in February 2013 were not coinci-
dentally simultaneous with the outflow resulting from Operation Serval. 
The discussion shows how the JAS AQIM faction and Ansaru re-integrated 
with the JAS Shekau faction in part because the former two entities no 
longer had a connection to AQIM and could best survive by allying with 
Shekau. This meant that AQIM lost virtually all of what it had “invested” 
in Nigeria. 
Even worse for AQIM, and for al-Qaeda more broadly, the newly reunited 
JAS under Shekau was courted by al-Qaeda’s rival, Islamic State, which 
showed little concern—even showing admiration — for Shekau’s violence. 
JAS would pledge loyalty to Islamic State and thus become its West Africa 
Province. But if AQIM’s investment was for the long term, perhaps it is still 
well situated be able to overcome this short-term setback and win a defec-
tion by West Africa Province—minus Shekau—back to al-Qaeda and, of 
course, under a new name brand. This could make al-Qaeda even stronger 
in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. Exploring that scenario is the topic 
that will conclude this case study.
The JAS Shekau Faction Wins Out 
One of the main effects of Operation Serval was that it severed the con-
nections between AQIM, the JAS AQIM faction, and Ansaru because 
of the deaths or arrests of the key couriers between them.106 This occurred 
on top of several actions by Nigerian counter-terrorism forces: arresting 
Kabiru Sokoto in January 2012; raiding Abu Muhammed’s base in Ka-
duna and killing him and others in his shura in March 2012 (and arresting 
members of the Kebbi-Sokoto cell the day after in the failed rescue attempt 
of the Italian and British hostages); killing members of the Kano cell that 
kidnapped the German engineer in May 2012; and killing Adam Kam-
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bar in Kano in August 2012 after an operative in the UN building attack 
informed on his location. Further, the JAS Shekau faction killed several 
key Ansaru operatives for defecting and also killed Ansaru’s spiritual leader. 
AQIM itself dispersed throughout North Africa, leaving the JAS AQIM 
faction and Ansaru to fend for themselves in Nigeria.
AQIM’s ability to control affairs in Nigeria was somewhat tenuous even 
months before Operation Serval was underway. In late 2012, Khalid 
al-Barnawi engaged in a reconciliation attempt with Shekau under the 
auspices of AQIM (likely MUJWA or Ansar Dine, to be specific) in Mali.107 
The parameters were that Shekau would appoint al-Barnawi’s followers to 
leadership positions and allow al-Barnawi to relocate some former Ansaru 
militants to Borno State, especially to the border region between Borno 
State and Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. This was under the condition that 
they coordinated any operations, including kidnappings, which Shekau 
would now accept, under the banner of JAS and in Shekau’s name.108 Mam-
man Nur and Abu Fatima would later join JAS under Shekau’s leadership, 
as did Muhammed Yusuf ’s son, Abu Musab al-Barnawi (real name Habib 
Yusuf ), rather than be marginalized from the insurgency altogether. The 
first public hint at such a reconciliation came in Shekau’s November 29, 
2012 video from Mali in which he praised the “Soldiers of Allah in the 
Islamic State in Mali,” while the video’s opening narration praised Ansaru’s 
prison break in Abuja three days earlier.109 
Operationally, the reconciliation became apparent in February 2013, when 
the tactic of kidnappings-of-foreigners for ransom entered the JAS Shekau 
faction’s AO for the first time, specifically in northern Cameroon. (Perhaps 
this was to separate al-Barnawi’s fighters from Shekau as part of the rec-
onciliation.) From February 2013 until July 2014, there were five separate 
kidnappings in northern Cameroon involving 22 foreigners that won for 
JAS over $10 million and several dozen prisoners in hostage exchanges.110  
These kidnappings were as follows:
 •  The first kidnapping, in February 2013, was of a French engineer and 
six members of his family, including three children. They were based in 
Yaoundé, Cameroon’s capital, but on safari in Waza, northern Cam-
eroon. The first proof-of-life video of the family posted on YouTube 
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featured an incorrect JAS logo on a flag and no JAS video branding, 
although the captors said they were JAS members and used certain 
distinct JAS introductory phrases. The captors also spoke in Arabic—a 
language typical of Ansaru, due to its exposure in North Africa—and 
said the kidnapping was revenge for France’s “war on Islam in Mali,” 
another distinctly Ansaru theme. The family was later transferred to 
JAS across the border in Borno State, where they were released after 
JAS made two hostage videos with formal JAS branding, including one 
with Shekau and the family in split-screen. This suggested the kidnap-
ping may have been a hybrid operation, with former Ansaru members 
capturing the family and transferring them to the JAS Shekau faction 
in Borno State. 
 •  The next kidnapping, of a French priest, took place in northern Camer-
oon in November 2013 and was jointly claimed by Ansaru and JAS.111 
JAS later released the priest on what it called “humanitarian grounds,” 
which was unusual, considering JAS, unlike Ansaru, had never expressed 
any type of mercy before. This again suggested the possible involvement 
of former Ansaru members. Reports said JAS received many millions of 
dollars for both the French family and the priest. 
 •  If former Ansaru members were involved in the first two kidnappings, it 
is likely they were also involved in the next three kidnappings of foreign-
ers in northern Cameroon, because the Cameroonian negotiators for JAS 
in the first two kidnappings were the same as in the third, fourth and fifth 
kidnappings.112 These next three kidnappings were of two Italian priests 
and a Canadian nun in April 2014; 10 Chinese engineers in May 2014; 
and a German aid worker in July 2014 (who was kidnapped Adamawa 
State, Nigeria but brought to Cameroon).113 All of the hostages in these 
three kidnappings were released by JAS for an undisclosed sum of money 
and JAS prisoners.
The start of this series of kidnappings overlapped with Ansaru’s kidnapping 
of the seven foreign engineers in Bauchi in February 2013. Ansaru took the 
engineers to the JAS Shekau faction’s main base in Sambisa Forest, Borno 
State (where they were later killed), suggesting Ansaru and the JAS Shekau 
faction had begun to share the same area of operations. Even before the 
Bauchi kidnapping, Ansaru operations had been gradually moving from 
northwestern Nigeria to northeastern Nigeria.114 
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If former Ansaru members were involved in the five kidnappings in north-
ern Cameroon, it is likely they also were behind the sudden emergence 
of kidnappings-for-ransom of Nigerian elites in Borno State and of other 
Cameroonians in northern Cameroon. These began in February 2013 
after not being part of the JAS attack repertoire in either country prior to 
that date. In what Nigerian security forces attributed to JAS’s new “special 
kidnapping squad,” kidnappings-for-ransom of Nigerian elites became a 
common tactic, particularly on the borderlands of Borno State. This net-
ted JAS from $10,000 to $300,000 per hostage exchange in several dozen 
operations after February 2013.115 
Even if Khalid al-Barnawi’s motivation for allying with Shekau was the 
need for survival after setbacks in northwestern Nigeria, if he or AQIM 
thought they could control Shekau’s violence, they were wrong. While 
JAS kidnappings, suicide bombings, narratives, and barracks raids all 
improved after the unification, in each case they went haywire under 
Shekau’s leadership.
For example, the Chibok kidnapping can be seen in the context of Khalid 
al-Barnawi introducing kidnapping expertise to JAS—although, given his 
al-Qaeda pedigree, it appears he abandoned JAS and returned to Ansaru 
either before or at the time of the Chibok kidnapping. Other former JAS 
AQIM faction members, such as Mamman Nur and Abu Fatima, remained 
with Shekau in the interest of unity (and from lack of other options with 
AQIM on the run in northern Mali), despite their disapproval of kidnap-
pings of, in particular, Muslims “apostates” who allegedly were guilty of 
participating in democracy. This issue would later cause them to split again 
from Shekau.
Suicide bombings in northeastern Nigeria were also a reflection of tactical 
influence from Ansaru and the JAS AQIM faction. One probable con-
tributor to this was former AQIM faction and Ansaru suicide bombing 
expert, Abu Fatima, who was involved in the first two suicide bombings at 
the Federal Police headquarters and UN building and rejoined JAS.  While 
the Shekau faction had conducted several suicide bombings in 2012, they 
were never a major part of its repertoire in the way that they dominated the 
AQIM faction’s operations. 
the al-qaeda accelerant in boko haram’s rise  63
But in 2014, 17 of 29 suicide bombings were in JAS’s area of operations 
in northeastern Nigeria, while eight were in the mutual area of operations 
in Kano and only four were in the former JAS AQIM faction AO. Shekau 
claimed several of the suicide bombings, such as Kano’s Grand Mosque 
in November 2014, which Ansaru condemned because it killed Muslims. 
The trend of the shift suicide bombings to the JAS AO continued in 2015, 
when of 119 suicide bombings in Nigeria that year, 113 were in JAS’s area 
of operations, including Cameroon, Chad, and Niger with 17, 11, and four 
attacks, respectively. There were, in contrast, only two suicide attacks in the 
former Ansaru and JAS AQIM faction area of operations and four suicide 
attacks in Kano in 2015. In 2016, the trend continued, with all 74 suicide 
attacks in JAS’s AO, including 40 suicide attacks in Borno State and 27 
suicide attacks in Cameroon. The clear trend was that the tactic of suicide 
bombing and the expertise in it completely shifted from northwestern 
Nigeria to the JAS Shekau faction’s AO. But where this tactic went haywire 
was on the issue of female suicide bombings. They are rejected in al-Qaeda 
ideology and practice.116 The only al-Qaeda leader to use female suicide 
bombings en masse was al-Zarqawi with AQI, and it was this tactic among 
his killings of civilians that began his break with al-Qaeda and led his suc-
cessors on the road to becoming Islamic State.117 
Female suicide bombings began in Nigeria in June 2014—one month after 
Shekau’s claim of the Chibok kidnapping, although no Chibok girls were 
used in such operations—with a series of about 10 attacks in the former 
JAS AQIM faction area of operations in mid-2014.  However, the sec-
ond such attack was so far south as to target a petrol tanker in Lagos after 
Shekau promised to attack that city. Shekau claimed the attack without 
specifying that it was carried it out by a woman, as images of the attacker’s 
corpse later showed.118 However, by 2015 and 2016, almost all female sui-
cide attacks in Nigeria—54 and 53, respectively, an unprecedented amount 
in terrorist history—were in the JAS AO in northeastern Nigeria. This 
suggests that pro-JAS-leaning “hardline” former elements of Ansaru, such 
as Abu Fatima, brought this tactic to JAS as they separated themselves from 
Ansaru’s al-Qaeda orientation both ideologically and operationally.
Beyond operations, another reflection of Ansaru’s influence on JAS was 
that JAS narratives, starting in 2014, began to take on a more historical 
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and pan-African approach like that of Ansaru (as well as AQIM, MUJWA, 
and Ansar Dine).119 This included newfound JAS references to Usman dan 
Fodio’s legacy, beginning with Shekau’s claim of the Chibok kidnapping that 
May and JAS claiming to establish an “Islamic State in biladis Sudan” (the 
latter part of Ansaru’s full name). When Abu Musab al-Barnawi became the 
JAS spokesman in early 2015, he declared that civilians who “repent” and 
did not take up arms against JAS would be spared, 120 reflecting Ansaru or 
former JAS Shekau faction influence on JAS. Even though Shekau adopted 
some Ansaru themes, such as Usman dan Fodio’s legacy, which may have 
been the result of former Ansaru members writing his “scripts,” there was, in 
fact, hybrid messaging in JAS after the unification. Shekau mostly continued 
glorifying brutality and civilian deaths, while some other JAS videos showed 
a more “humane” aspect, as if there were two media teams: Shekau’s; and 
one of former Ansaru and JAS AQIM faction members. Nonetheless, this 
“Jekyll and Hyde” persona of JAS was still beyond the pale for al-Qaeda-
style image management to not be seen as ever killing innocent Muslims.
As discussed below, it was the March 2013 raids of military barracks in 
Monguno, Borno State that represented the apex of JAS’s power after 
the integration of former Ansaru, JAS AQIM faction, and Mali-based 
militants with the Shekau faction. This empowered Shekau unlike ever 
before. But it was the control of territory after over-running military 
barracks in northeastern Nigeria that made theoretical concerns about 
Shekau’s takfirism become highly practical. While AQIM could claim 
some credit for JAS’s “successes”—as Abu Yayhya al-Libi had done years 
earlier— it was in no place to condone many of the group’s tactics under 
Shekau. By the time of the Chibok kidnapping in April 2014, AQIM had 
largely divested itself of the “Frankenstein” it helped create.
Creating the Caliphate
With former Ansaru and JAS AQIM faction members now unified in JAS 
under Shekau’s leadership, an empowered JAS began creating the condi-
tions for Shekau’s declaration of an Islamic State (not the Islamic State) in 
northeastern Nigeria.121 From April to October 2013, JAS raided military 
barracks or destroyed towns in Borno State, causing massive civilian casual-
ties, including 127 dead in Damatru, 142 in Benisheikh, 55 in Bama, 44 in 
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Konduga, 41 in Gujba, and 35 in Demba. These attacks coincided with the 
above-mentioned suicide bombing campaign, including dozens of women 
and girls, and the kidnapping-for-random operations in Borno State and 
northern Cameroon. 
In March 2014, JAS—now largely in control of the countryside in Borno 
State—organized an attacked the Giwa (“elephant” in Hausa) military bar-
racks in Borno State’s capital, Maiduguri, and freed hundreds of prisoners. 
JAS showed the operation in a Shekau-claimed propaganda video where 
he bombastically called Giwa barracks the “pig’s barracks” and hinted that 
the “revival of slavery” was to come: “You should all abandon the univer-
sity. I totally detest the university. Bastards [Boys]! You should leave the 
university. Western education is forbidden. Girls! You should all go back 
to your various houses. Enslaving the unbelievers’ women is permissible. 
In the future, we will capture the women and sell them in the market.” 122 
These raids effectively caused the Nigerian military to abandon large swaths 
of the countryside in Borno State and parts of neighboring Yobe State and 
Adamawa State, while showing that not even Maiduguri was secure. This 
enabled JAS to carry out the Chibok kidnapping because the military had 
left the countryside unprotected. 
While JAS was rising in power to unprecedented levels, AQIM was fo-
cusing on regenerating its insurgency in rural areas of northern Mali and 
establishing front groups and sub-affiliates in Tunisia and Libya, includ-
ing with remnants of the brigade of the now deceased Abu Zeid. AQIM 
had little leverage over, and increasingly less interest in, events in Nigeria, 
even though it still included Shekau on communications. Shekau was, for 
example, informed by the leader of AQIM’s Tunisian affiliate, Abu Iyad al-
Tunisi, as late as July 2014 with al-Baghdadi’s declaration of the Islamic that 
al-Qaeda should join al-Baghdadi to “moderate” him. Al-Qaeda would, 
however, reject this plan and ultimately decide to challenge al-Baghdadi on 
ideological grounds, arguing that Islamic State was khawarij.123 Al-Tunisi 
retracted his letter after it was leaked publicly.
But it was new competition from what was still called Islamic State in Iraq 
and al-Sham (ISIS) in early 2014 that destroyed the final link between 
AQIM and Shekau. Shekau evidently agreed with al-Tunisi’s letter, al-
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though with no intention of moderating al-Baghdadi. Al-Qaeda leader 
Ayman al-Zawahiri ordered ISIS to stay in Iraq and allow al-Qaeda’s Syrian 
affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, to operate in Syria. But al-Baghdadi ignored him 
and expanded into Syria, declaring the caliphate in July 2014 and renaming 
ISIS as Islamic State—implying it was a global caliphate to which all jihad-
ist groups must pledge loyalty. Thus, al-Qaeda and Islamic State became 
two distinct entities. In this context, Islamic State saw JAS’s control over 
large swaths of territory in northeastern Nigeria as valuable for its global 
expansion (or at least its propaganda), especially since that would mean al-
Qaeda would lose an asset in Nigeria. 
Unlike al-Qaeda, which sought to integrate JAS into its global network 
while preserving a brand reputation for respecting civilian lives, Islamic 
State was most concerned with promoting a brand of baqiya and tatama-
dad (“remaining and expanding”). No matter how brutal, violence was a 
new positive for Islamic State because it gained attention for the newly 
declared caliphate. Even though such images repulsed the Muslim masses, 
they also attracted the few select Muslims from around the world who were 
attracted to such highly stylized displays of brutality. Shekau’s violence 
was thus not problematic for Islamic State, while JAS’s tamkin, or on-the-
ground authority, was extremely valuable for an organization that prided 
itself on holding territory in a caliphate. (Al-Qaeda, in contrast, cautioned 
against declarations of an “Islamic State” when its longevity was not as-
sured.)124 Most new “provinces” from which Islamic State was able to win 
loyalty were relatively small al-Qaeda break-offs with no real tamkin, while 
all formal al-Qaeda affiliates such as AQIM, AQAP, and al-Shabab stayed 
loyal to al-Qaeda. JAS therefore had more tamkin than virtually any other 
prospective “province” that Islamic State could attract. 
Witnessing the rise of ISIS and then Islamic State, Shekau embraced al-
Baghdadi like he had previously embraced al-Qaeda. Even three months 
before al-Baghdadi’s declaration of the caliphate, Shekau showed his admi-
ration for ISIS in the beginning of his claim of the Chibok kidnapping, for 
example, chanting an ISIS slogan among his followers, “dawlat al-Islamiya 
qamat, dawlat al-Islamiya baqiya” (“the Islamic State is established, the 
Islamic State remains”). Islamic State members saw these chants as well as 
Shekau’s imitation of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s style of shooting a gun, his 
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defense of the “revival of slavery,” and his war call of “Sheka-ka-ka-ka-u” as 
signs of strength.125 Throughout 2014, JAS videos showed the group was 
inspired by Islamic State. In some cases, JAS videographers collaborated 
with Islamic State (perhaps remotely) on special effects and symbolism, 
with Islamic State’s flag, its terminology such as Sahwa and “breaking bor-
ders,” and its nasheeds appearing in JAS videos.126 In one video, Shekau even 
appeared in a mosque in Borno State and gestured in a manner similar to 
al-Baghdadi, calmly, unlike his typical bombastic style.  
As Islamic State sought to formalize the relationship with JAS as a “prov-
ince” in late 2014, it faced two obstacles. The first was that Islamic State 
had no direct connection to Shekau but wanted him to be the leader of its 
new “West Africa Province.” Unity of factions was a requirement for new 
“provinces,” and Shekau was the most recognizable JAS leader; without a 
recognizable JAS leader, any pledge would lack credibility. Instead, Islamic 
State in Syria had lines of communications to its new “provinces” in Libya 
and supporters in Tunisia, which were comprised of former members of 
Abu Zeid’s brigade and other AQIM brigades that had defected to Islamic 
State. These Libya- and Tunisia-based Islamic State members, in turn, 
had lines of communications with Mamman Nur, who like other former 
members of Ansaru and the JAS AQIM faction, such as Abu Fatima and 
Abu Musab al-Barnawi, were now unified with Shekau.127 Nur, Fatima, 
and al-Barnawi were prepared to join Islamic State out of their belief that 
al-Baghdadi fulfilled the qualifications to be a caliph, including having tam-
kin, being of the prophetic bloodline, and receiving the support of Islamic 
scholars. The second obstacle for Islamic State, however, was that as much 
as Shekau showed his admiration for Islamic State, he did not want to be 
under the authority of another leader, even though he believed al-Baghdadi 
was a legitimate caliph.
Even though a pledge from Shekau was still uncertain, in January 2015, the 
AQIM-turned-Islamic State fighters in North Africa set up a Twitter account 
with al-Barnawi as the spokesman, so that Islamic State could promote JAS 
before an impending pledge to al-Baghdadi. This was just after a JAS attack 
in Bama reportedly killed 2,000 people, leading AQIM to terminate relations 
with JAS. The new Twitter account featured a number of videos, statements, 
and tweets in typical Islamic State style introducing JAS to Islamic State’s 
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global followership and hinting at the inevitability of a pledge. It also includ-
ed some distinctly Ansaru rhetoric, since al-Barnawi was its spokesman and 
the Shekau faction was not included on the Twitter account. For example, in 
an introductory video, al-Barnawi said that JAS only killed civilians in Bama 
who did not “repent.”  In contrast, Shekau, who was not yet part of the Twit-
ter account, boasted of killing people in the attack.
In early February 2015, JAS, including Nur, Fatima, al-Barnawi, and 
Shekau as well as remaining Ansaru members, held a shura that resulted in 
Nur and Fatima “compelling” Shekau to make a pledge to al-Baghdadi; if 
he did not, they would break from him and divide the group.128 To main-
tain unity, Shekau agreed to make the pledge. On March 7, 2015, a video 
of Shekau’s pledge was featured on the Twitter account; on March 12, 2015 
al-Baghdadi via his spokesman accepted the pledge and declared the new 
West Africa Province, and Islamic State issued 10 videos celebrating Shek-
au’s pledge from “provinces” in Algeria, Yemen, Libya, Syria and Iraq.129 
AQIM did not issue a statement; it had by this time seen its former allies 
merge with Shekau and, even though they talked of respecting civilian lives, 
they still accepted JAS’s reign of terror. Al-Qaeda, for its part, in 2015 was 
coordinating a narrative strategy across all of its affiliates against Islamic 
State, with a focus on its takfirism—the same claim the GSPC had lever-
aged against the GIA and that Ansaru had leveraged against JAS. Promi-
nent al-Qaeda supporters on jihadist forums regarded JAS’s turn to Islamic 
State in this regard as “insignificant,” as by now JAS was already lost from 
the al-Qaeda fold. 130 
Ansaru, which disapproved of any alliance with Islamic State, was likely 
aware, although not part of, the ongoing discussions among JAS leading up 
to Shekau’s pledge to al-Baghdadi. For the first time, Ansaru issued a video 
condemning Shekau by name and mocking him, with a clip of Shekau 
scratching his crotch from the video where he claimed the November 2014 
Grand Mosque bombing in Kano.131 Ansaru also showed a video claim-
ing its first operation since 2013 at a military checkpoint in Bauchi State, 
reiterating its commitment to Usman dan Fodio’s legacy, and commiserat-
ing with civilians in the town of Mundu in Bauchi State, which Nigerian 
soldiers burnt to the ground after an attack.132 This could not, however, 
overcome the fact that Ansaru was in effect operationally irrelevant. Al-
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Barnawi’s arrest in April 2016 would only further weaken it, as did some 
members subsequently defecting to join the new West Africa Province.133 
Thus, in March 2015, the new West Africa Province was, at least nominally, 
united and under the banner of the Islamic State. But could Islamic State 
mediate between the two factions—Nur, Fatima, and al-Barnawi versus 
Shekau—or could it be bothered to? Would it even care about these inter-
nal dynamics once it could propagate that it had expanded to West Africa? 
The next section discusses how Islamic State’s relatively hands-off approach 
to West Africa Province (compared to AQIM with Ansaru and JAS) and 
West Africa Province’s own internal fissures led to a repetition of history.
The Caliphate in Crisis
After Shekau’s pledge to al-Baghdadi, the new West Africa Province im-
mediately came under unprecedented pressure. After a presidential election 
that brought to power former military ruler Muhammed Buhari in March 
2015 and a State of Emergency military offensive in February 2015, Nige-
ria using Nigerien, Chadian, and Cameroonian forces and South African 
contractors drove West Africa Province out of most territories it held, 
causing it to lose tamkin. The al-Barnawi faction of West Africa Province—
referring to those fighters formerly in Ansaru and the JAS AQIM faction 
and aligned with al-Barnawi, Nur and Fatima—consolidated its operations 
on Nigeria’s borders with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. There it focused on 
raids and sporadic, often retaliatory, bombings in neighboring countries, 
including in N’djamena, the Chadian capital, for the first time in June 
2015. The West Africa Province Shekau faction—referring to those fighters 
historically in the JAS Shekau faction—retreated into Borno State’s Sambi-
sa Forest, which it used as a base for attacks on military and civilian targets. 
During this downturn for West Africa Province, the same internal factional 
issues that plagued relations between JAS and the JAS AQIM faction and 
Ansaru played out again. The al-Barnawi faction could no longer co-exist 
with the Shekau faction and its proclivity for causing civilian deaths, which 
it believed would cause West Africa Province to lose local popular support, 
embolden the rise of civilian militias to oppose it, and contradict theo-
logical prohibitions against killing Muslim civilians. Shekau, for instance, 
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ordered a female suicide attack on an internally displaced persons (IDP) 
camp near Maiduguri, which killed nearly 100 people, justifying it on 
grounds that the Muslim IDPs were “apostates” for receiving services from 
an “un-Islamic” government, an attack that the al-Barnawi faction opposed. 
In addition, the al-Barnawi faction accused Shekau of hoarding supplies 
while children were dying of starvation and killing militants without expla-
nation who disagreed with him, including fighters and civilians whose only 
crime was holding a government ID card. Shekau also killed militants with 
key skill sets, such the lead bomb maker, for defecting to the al-Barnawi 
faction.135 Al-Barnawi, in contrast, wanted his fighters to “booby-trap and 
blow up every church that [they] are able to reach, and kill all of those who 
[they] find from the citizens of the Cross,” including “Crusader relief orga-
nizations” that exploit “the displaced in the raging war, and provide them 
with food and shelter and then Christianize their children.”136 However, 
al-Barnawi employed the Islamic theological tool of deferment, or irja’, 
to argue that ordinary Muslim civilians who did not actively oppose West 
Africa Province should not be judged as apostates. 
Separately, Nur and Fatima accused Shekau of disregarding al-Baghdadi’s 
orders to distinguish between two categories of female “apostates”: first, 
Muslim women who participate in democracy, who could be given a pass 
based on the theological tool of irja’; and, second, “unbelievers,” such as 
the Christian Chibok girls, who could be kept as slaves. Shekau kept both 
groups as slaves and believed that the al-Barnawi faction, which controlled 
the communications to Islamic State and cut off his faction from commu-
nicating with Islamic State, was deceiving him about al-Baghdadi’s orders. 
The animosity became so great that Shekau refused to meet with the al-
Barnawi faction because he believed Nur would place tracking devices at his 
hideouts that would cause him to be captured. 137 
As a result of complaints of the al-Barnawi faction to Islamic State against 
Shekau, as well as the deaths of the North African Islamic State members 
who had favored Shekau and al-Barnawi’s continued control of West Africa 
Province’s communications with Islamic State, in early 2016 Islamic State 
began promoting West Africa Province operations in Niger that were 
carried out by the al-Barnawi faction. Then, in August 2016, Islamic State 
the al-qaeda accelerant in boko haram’s rise  71
announced that al-Barnawi would be the new wali of the West Africa Prov-
ince.138 At the end of the day, Islamic State saw Shekau as expendable: what 
it needed for its narrative purposes was to have a “province” in West Africa, 
even if that did not supply with it the same level of training and resources 
as AQIM had done for JAS and Ansaru. Even though Shekau was doctrin-
ally closer to Islamic State than al-Barnawi was, Islamic State was willing to 
drop him—although perhaps it had little choice, as al-Barnawi ultimately 
controlled the lines of communications. 
For Shekau, being dropped from the role of wali only liberated him to be 
independent, as he had always preferred. Shekau still maintained that al-
Baghdadi was a legitimate caliph and maintained his claim to be leading an 
Islamic State in a West Africa Province, but he reverted to leading it under 
the brand of JAS, now in its second iteration. Shekau also blamed al-Bar-
nawi for “cutting off ” his communications with Islamic State and “creating 
divisions” that led to the breakup of the Islamic State’s West Africa Province 
and accused al-Barnawi of “polytheism” for “innovating” his own Sharia 
laws, such as irja’, instead of following Quran and hadith as per Shekau’s 
interpretation.139 
As a consequence of the breakup of West Africa Province and the cre-
ation of the second iteration of JAS, some militants in what had been the 
Shekau faction defected to the West Africa Province under al-Barnawi, 
including Shekau’s spokesman since 2013. He had been overseeing some 
of the Chibok girls. This allowed the first exchange for some Chibok 
schoolgirls to take place in October 2016, when 23 girls were released for 
an undisclosed sum of money.140 Shekau, however, then ordered his fight-
ers to kill his former spokesman, which they did before the end of 2016.141 
Shekau nonetheless took advantage of the lines of communication with 
between members of his factions and the negotiators on the government 
side through the facilitation of the Swiss government and ICRC to make 
another separate deal in May 2017 in which 83 girls were exchanged for 
several high-level JAS prisoners (one girl, however, decide to stay with her 
JAS “husband” and thus did not leave the camp). 
Nonetheless, the general parameters of the second iteration of JAS and 
West Africa Province roughly matched the same areas of operations as 
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before the split. JAS in its second iteration operated mostly around Sam-
bisa Forest; and Shekau tried to break his isolation by reaching out to 
French-speaking fighters from around the Lake Chad region.142 West Africa 
Province operated mostly around the Borno State borderlands with Niger, 
Chad, and Cameroon and focused on targeting civilians who collaborated 
with the government.143 Ansaru, meanwhile, continued in operational 
dormancy within Nigeria, despite al-Qaeda still recognizing it in a January 
2017 publication.
Discussion Questions
1.  How did the incorporation of kidnappings into JAS operations support 
its funding? How may this have also supported other aspects of the esca-
lation of violence after the start of the kidnapping campaign? 
2.  Do the shifting alliances between both JAS factions and Ansaru appear 
to be for the short term or long term, influenced by external actors or 
internal dynamics, based on ideological or strategic concerns? 
3.  How is reviving lost empires a specific al-Qaeda narrative tool, and how 
did Ansaru and later JAS exploit such narratives? Given Shekau’s local 
support base, could these narratives have had a negative effect on his 
recruitment? How can these types of narratives be combated in terms of 
government/civil society counter-narrative efforts?
4.  In what way was Shekau’s pledge to al-Baghdadi beneficial to JAS? In 
what ways was it beneficial to Islamic State? Does the fact that a pledge 
was made mean that the relationship between JAS or the new West 
Africa Province and Islamic State was deeper than al-Qaeda’s relationship 
with the Nigerian Taliban, Ansaru, or JAS?
5.  What are some of the reasons AQIM barely commented or offered an ex-
planation to its supporters after Shekau’s pledge to Islamic State or after 
the pledges of other small AQIM breakaway factions to Islamic State?
6.  In what ways did the skill sets of the former JAS AQIM faction, Ansaru, 
and Mali-based militants from Mali complement the skill sets of the JAS 
Shekau faction? In what ways were their styles contradictory? 
7.  How did the holding of territory, or tamkin, prove to be a liability for 
West Africa Province (a) in terms of strategy and (b) in terms of leading 
to the issues that arose between its two factions about the treatment of 
civilians? In addition, how does al-Qaeda’s gradual approach to establish-
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ing a calipate make having tamkin less of a priority and provide certain 
strategic advantages for it over Islamic State? 
8.  Did West Africa Province’s breakup into the al-Barnawi-led West Africa 
Province and the Shekau-led JAS in its second iteration represent a 
counterinsurgency success, or might it complicate counterinsurgency 
efforts? In what way could disagreements with Shekau over his targeting 
of civilians and even other co-militants be leveraged for counterinsur-
gent purposes?
9.  What was the impact of Operation Serval on Nigeria? Was Operation 
Serval a success at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels? What does 
this tell us about the second- and third-order effects of military interven-
tions against armed groups? 
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Conclusion: Future Scenarios
As of spring 2017, the Islamic State is in the process of losing tamkin in its 
own heartland of Iraq and Syria. In late 2016, it also lost control of the ter-
ritories it held in Libya that served as its base for coordinating West Africa 
Province and other new and prospective provinces in Africa. AQIM, mean-
while recovered from the losses it suffered in Operational Serval in January 
2017 and announced a new group backed by al-Qaeda overall leadership 
called Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam 
and Muslims).144 This group brought together the ethnically Tuareg leader 
of Ansar Dine, Ag Ghaly, who is the overall leader of the new group; the 
ethnically Fulani Katiba Macina145 leader Hamadou Kufa, who led MU-
JWA in the battle at Konna; the ethnically Algerian Arab leader of AQIM’s 
Sahara Region, Yahia Abu al-Hamam; the ethnically Berber AQIM Islamic 
law judge Abou Abderrahman El; and the ethnically Malian Tangara (refer-
ring to the clan’s Mauritanian ancestry) Arab Al-Hasan al-Ansari, who is the 
deputy leader of al-Mourabitun under Mokhtar Belmokhtar and cousin of a 
MUJWA founder. The multiple ethnicities of these leaders, their appeals to 
sub-Saharan African jihadist history, and their merging together under “one 
banner, one group, one emir [leader]” was a culmination of AQIM’s south-
wards expansion and localization in Mali and sub-Saharan West Africa. 
Moreover, the new group counters Islamic State’s accusations against 
al-Qaeda of being under “multiple banners” (instead of one Islamic State) 
through its display of unity, while in its founding statement it also claimed 
the legacy, however contradictorily, of al-Zarqawi and, of course, bin 
Laden. Moreover, the videos of the AQIM Sahara Branch, which will likely 
carry over to the new group, have adopted Islamic State choreography and 
slogans, such as the promise to “conquer Rome [the West],” and AQIM 
more broadly has upgraded its social media output to rival the quality of 
Islamic State.146 Much of this came as a response to Abu Iyad al-Tunisi’s 
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letter, when AQIM realized that if it did not update its media and message 
it would risk losing many of its young fighters in North and West Africa to 
Islamic State.
Although AQIM does not control territory like it did in northern Mali 
before Operation Serval, it is carrying out attacks in Mali at its highest rates 
since 2012. In late 2015 and early 2016, AQIM in coordination with Ansar 
Dine and Katiba Macina also killed dozens of foreigners at international 
hotels in the capitals of Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire; Ouagadougou, Burkina 
Faso; and Bamako, Mali. This showed AQIM’s potential to expand in the 
region.147 With AQIM strong (and Islamic State relatively weak) in West 
Africa, AQIM has repelled Islamic State expansion in the region and has 
even begun to actively try to “rehabilitate” Islamic State members who 
have retreated from the fighting in Libya or returned to North Africa from 
Syria, in order to facilitate their joining AQIM. Islamic State only has West 
Africa Province as part of its formal network in West Africa, but also main-
tains informal brigades comprised of some former MUJWA commanders 
elsewhere in the Burkina Faso-Mali-Niger border axis.
Given this context, with Nur and Fatima—former JAS AQIM faction and 
Ansaru members, respectively—now leading West Africa Province, could 
they return to the al-Qaeda fold? Would the new group, Jama’at Nusrat 
al-Islam wal-Muslimin, welcome them back? If al-Baghdadi was killed or 
Islamic State folded, would Nur and Fatima still view him as a legitimate 
caliph and stick with Islamic State? Would they prefer to be “independent,” 
or link with Shekau again? Might they have been duped by Islamic State’s 
own propaganda about the vitality of the caliphate and regret having joined 
once they see how quickly the caliphate folded, judging that al-Qaeda 
“gradual approach” is wiser? It would likely not be difficult to reconnect 
with AQIM if they chose to do so. How could West Africa Province’s tac-
tics change if it reconnected with AQIM? 
Historically, the JAS AQIM faction and Ansaru tried to create tensions 
between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria’s Middle Belt.  Now in Mali, 
the new group—particularly via Hamadou Kufa’s Katiba Macina—is back-
ing ethnic Fulanis against ethnic Bambaras, who are perceived as being 
“less Islamic” than the Fulani.148 Could West Africa Province re-establish its 
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presence in the Middle Belt, possibly by allying with remnant Ansaru mem-
bers who are still there, and incite not only Muslim-Christian tensions but 
specifically Fulani tensions with Christians, portraying itself as the protec-
tor of Fulanis as well as Muslims? Could it do the same in Borno State and 
begin to more deeply embed itself in Kanuri communities? If so, would it 
need Shekau’s help or need to pull fighters from JAS? Could either another 
unification or a further break in JAS lead to opportunities to negotiate for 
the Chibok girls? 
Moreover, if Nur and Fatima and thereby also al-Barnawi rejoined AQIM, 
might AQIM compel them to release the Chibok girls and other slaves? 
If so, does this suggest that patience in negotiations over the Chibok girls 
may lead to their freedom and be a better long-term strategy than paying 
for their freedom? Finally, did the JAS AQIM faction and Ansaru rely too 
much on Salafi networks in recruitment and not enough on ethnic factors?
 These are all questions that analysts, scholars, and military officials should 
contemplate as they consider counter-“Boko Haram” strategies in West Af-
rica—or, as this case study shows, should they not consider “counter-West 
Africa Province” and “counter-JAS” strategies?
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Study Guide 
Discussion Questions  from the text
CHAPTER ONE 
 1.   The Chibok kidnapping was JAS’s most infamous operation. What 
factors enabled JAS to carry out this attack, and how significant is the 
operation in the context of JAS’s rise and evolution? 
 2.   At the time of this writing, more than 200 Chibok girls (and untold 
number of others) are still hostage to JAS and West Africa Province 
(they are believed to be divided among both groups), while the Nigerian 
government claims “Boko Haram” controls no more territory. Is this 
possible? What does the groups’ ability to hold so many girls for so long 
say about their strength and operational security? Moreover, why might 
both groups be so patient, more than three years later?
 3.   How do the Islamic State and AQIM expansion models differ? To what 
extent do both groups prioritize ideology, narratives, tactics, and relation-
ships? What challenges does a leader like Shekau pose for both groups? 
 4.   Would JAS, West Africa Province, and Ansaru be best combated 
through the paradigm of an “anti-Boko Haram” strategy, or would dis-
tinguishing between groups be more effective? Why?
 5.   What were the key inflection points that caused the Nigerian Taliban 
to become JAS; Ansaru to split from JAS; JAS to become West Ansaru 
Province; and JAS (in its second iteration) to leave West Africa Province? 
 6.   What significance do the names, or “branding,” reflect for the Nige-
rian Taliban, JAS, Ansaru (and AQLBS before it), and West Africa 
Province? Are they just labels, or can they help determine the potential 
tactics, evolution, and recruitment strategies of groups? What about 
ISIS and Islamic State? 
 7.   What enabled Shekau to survive so long as a leader? Has he been re-
sponsible for tactical innovations or alliances, or has he played a more 
passive role in those regards? If Shekau died, would it be a net posi-
tive, or could it lead fighters to join West Africa Province and end up 
strengthening it? 
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 8.   Was the rise of Nigerian Taliban into JAS, Ansaru, and West Africa 
Province inevitable? In particular, what role did reactions to al-Qaeda 
in 2001 by the U.S., to the Nigerian Taliban after 2004, and to the 
Nigerian Taliban after 2009 play? Why has the Nigerian military prac-
tice of violently crushing groups worked in the past but not with the 
Nigerian Taliban/JAS?
 9.   Understanding al-Qaeda strategies in its move towards Nigeria, such 
as economic warfare, overstretching U.S forces, and furthering its own 
narratives as well as the desire of AQIM to increase its fund through 
kidnappings in Nigeria, how could the U.S. shape its approach to coun-
terterrorism coordination with Nigeria? Moreover, how can  
al-Qaeda’s challenges in expanding to Nigeria be used against it? 
 10.   Based on AQIM’s shift south since the early 1990s, how could Nigeria 
have prepared its eventual arrival in that country? What evidence or 
indicators should Nigeria have been looking at to pre-empt AQIM 
infiltration? 
 11.   In the analytical lexicon, the word “affiliate” is used to describe groups 
in the al-Qaeda network. But the Nigerian Taliban, JAS (in its first 
iteration), and Ansaru were all in al-Qaeda’s network but not formal 
affiliates, and their relationships with al-Qaeda were different. How 
could one best type these groups within the al-Qaeda network?
 12.   To what extent did al-Qaeda accelerate the rise of “Boko Haram”/ 
Nigerian Taliban and its successors? 
CHAPTER TWO  
 1.   What explains AQIM’s mixed support for the JAS Shekau faction 
attacks? 
 2.   How may Shekau’s belief that Muslims who participate in democracy 
are “apostates” on the same level as Christian “infidels” have led him to 
have a different targeting strategy and preferences than AQIM (recall 
the prior discussion on takfirism and the GIA)? 
 3.   If Shekau’s fighters were mostly Kanuris, how might this have affected 
the targeting strategy and areas of operations of his faction compared 
to the JAS AQIM faction, whose members were more likely to have 
traveled abroad after the July 2009 clashes and been from other Nige-
rian ethnicities?
 4.   How did the four attacks profiled above support the overall al-Qaeda 
strategy for Nigeria?
 5.   To what extent were the much fewer suicide bombings in the AO of the 
JAS Shekau faction compared to the JAS AQIM faction related to dif-
ferences in ideology or levels of training between the two factions? 
 6.   The words “terrorism” and “insurgency” have been used interchangeably, 
especially in the Nigerian context. To what extent would distinguishing 
between these terms—and the types of violence seen in 2012 in the areas 
of operations of the JAS Shekau faction and JAS AQIM faction—be-
come relevant in develop a strategy to counter JAS?
 7.   How do the different backgrounds of Khalid al-Barnawi and Shekau 
reflect their “near enemy” vs. “far enemy” approaches? 
 8.   What does AQIM’s relationship to both JAS factions and Ansaru sug-
gest about the potential risks, or difficulties, in al-Qaeda’s expansion into 
Nigeria or any other country? What was the role of AQIM and other 
outside actors in the evolution of both JAS factions and Ansaru?  
 9.   Did the JAS Shekau faction, the JAS AQIM faction, or Ansaru pose the 
biggest threat? What metrics would one use to assess this? How does the 
answer depend on who is assessing the threat, such as the Nigerian gov-
ernment, an international NGO or company, or the U.S. government? 
CHAPTER THREE 
 1.   How did the incorporation of kidnappings into JAS operations sup-
port its funding? How may this have also supported other aspects of 
the escalation of violence after the start of the kidnapping campaign? 
 2.   Do the shifting alliances between both JAS factions and Ansaru appear 
to be for the short term or long term, influenced by external actors or 
internal dynamics, based on ideological or strategic concerns? 
 3.   How is reviving lost empires a specific al-Qaeda narrative tool, and 
how did Ansaru and later JAS exploit such narratives? Given Shekau’s 
local support base, could these narratives have had a negative effect on 
his recruitment? How can these types of narratives be combated in 
terms of government/civil society counter-narrative efforts?
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 4.  In what way was Shekau’s pledge to al-Baghdadi beneficial to JAS? In 
what ways was it beneficial to Islamic State? Does the fact that a pledge 
was made mean that the relationship between JAS or the new West Af-
rica Province and Islamic State was deeper than al-Qaeda’s relationship 
with the Nigerian Taliban, Ansaru, or JAS?
 5.  What are some of the reasons AQIM barely commented or offered an 
explanation to its supporters after Shekau’s pledge to Islamic State or 
after the pledges of other small AQIM breakaway factions to Islamic 
State?
 6.  In what ways did the skill sets of the former JAS AQIM faction, An-
saru, and Mali-based militants from Mali complement the skill sets of 
the JAS Shekau faction? In what ways were their styles contradictory? 
 7.  How did the holding of territory, or tamkin, prove to be a liability for 
West Africa Province (a) in terms of strategy and (b) in terms of leading 
to the issues that arose between its two factions about the treatment of 
civilians? In addition, how does al-Qaeda’s gradual approach to estab-
lishing a calipate make having tamkin less of a priority and provide 
certain strategic advantages for it over Islamic State? 
 8.   Did West Africa Province’s breakup into the al-Barnawi-led West Af-
rica Province and the Shekau-led JAS in its second iteration represent 
a counterinsurgency success, or might it complicate counterinsurgency 
efforts? In what way could disagreements with Shekau over his target-
ing of civilians and even other co-militants be leveraged for counterin-
surgent purposes?
 9.  What was the impact of Operation Serval on Nigeria? Was Operation 
Serval a success at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels? What 
does this tell us about the second- and third-order effects of military 
interventions against armed groups? 
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Additional Discussion Questions
 1.   The Chibok kidnapping was JAS’s most infamous operation. What 
factors enabled JAS to carry out this attack, and how significant is the 
operation in the context of JAS’s rise and evolution? 
 2.   At the time of this writing, more than 200 Chibok girls (and untold 
number of others) are still hostage to JAS and West Africa Province 
(they are believed to be divided among both groups), while the Nige-
rian government claims “Boko Haram” controls no more territory. Is 
this possible? What does the groups’ ability to hold so many girls for so 
long say about their strength and operational security? Moreover, why 
might both groups be so patient, more than three years later?
 3.   How do the Islamic State and AQIM expansion models differ? To 
what extent do both groups prioritize ideology, narratives, tactics, and 
relationships? What challenges does a leader like Shekau pose for both 
groups? 
 4.   Would JAS, West Africa Province, and Ansaru be best combated 
through the paradigm of an “anti-Boko Haram” strategy, or would 
distinguishing between groups be more effective? Why?
 5.   What were the key inflection points that caused the Nigerian Taliban 
to become JAS; Ansaru to split from JAS; JAS to become West An-
saru Province; and JAS (in its second iteration) to leave West Africa 
Province? 
 6.   What significance do the names, or “branding,” reflect for the Nige-
rian Taliban, JAS, Ansaru (and AQLBS before it), and West Africa 
Province? Are they just labels, or can they help determine the potential 
tactics, evolution, and recruitment strategies of groups? What about 
ISIS and Islamic State? 
 7.   What enabled Shekau to survive so long as a leader? Has he been 
responsible for tactical innovations or alliances, or has he played a 
more passive role in those regards? If Shekau died, would it be a net 
positive, or could it lead fighters to join West Africa Province and 
end up strengthening it? 
 8.   Was the rise of Nigerian Taliban into JAS, Ansaru, and West Africa 
Province inevitable? In particular, what role did reactions to al-Qaeda 
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in 2001 by the U.S., to the Nigerian Taliban after 2004, and to the 
Nigerian Taliban after 2009 play? Why has the Nigerian military prac-
tice of violently crushing groups worked in the past but not with the 
Nigerian Taliban/JAS?
 9.   Understanding al-Qaeda strategies in its move towards Nigeria, such 
as economic warfare, overstretching U.S forces, and furthering its own 
narratives as well as the desire of AQIM to increase its fund through 
kidnappings in Nigeria, how could the U.S. shape its approach to coun-
terterrorism coordination with Nigeria? Moreover, how can  
al-Qaeda’s challenges in expanding to Nigeria be used against it? 
 10.   Based on AQIM’s shift south since the early 1990s, how could Nigeria 
have prepared its eventual arrival in that country? What evidence or 
indicators should Nigeria have been looking at to pre-empt AQIM 
infiltration? 
 11.   In the analytical lexicon, the word “affiliate” is used to describe groups 
in the al-Qaeda network. But the Nigerian Taliban, JAS (in its first 
iteration), and Ansaru were all in al-Qaeda’s network but not formal 
affiliates, and their relationships with al-Qaeda were different. How 
could one best type these groups within the al-Qaeda network?
 12.   To what extent did al-Qaeda accelerate the rise of “Boko Haram”/ 
Nigerian Taliban and its successors? 
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